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The urban housing system in most of Central and East Europe (CEE) is undergoing
decentralization, deregulation, and privatization together with other basic changes due to the fall
of the iron curtain, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the reinstitution of democracy. This
literature review shows that while there was a housing shortage in CEE during the period of state
socialism, the privatization that has occurred since about 1990 has not yet begun to close the gap.
Much of the problem these days is focused on the lack of affordable housing and urban
infrastructure, scarcity of funds that would enable building, and difficulties of obtaining what
few loans exist. This situation is not likely to improve until the CEE economies begin to grow
again (as they have begun to do in countries like Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and the
Czech Republic
2); housing shortages seem to be least in the CEE countries whose economies are
most robust.
1. INTRODUCTION
In most countries of Central and East Europe the urban housing sector is economically
important, accounting for 10 to 20 percent of total economic activity. In view of its implications
for land use, energy consumption, waste generation, and water pollution, it also has a significant
effect on sustainability of development (UNECE 1998a, p. vii). Thus, a prime development need
in CEE, according to the World Bank (1996), is to improve the performance of the urban
housing sector for:
a)  economic reasons: not only is a sizable percent of GDP generated by investment in the
housing sector, expenditures for services to housing are also important, thus, management
and performance of the housing sector have a major influence on overall national economic
performance;
                                               
1 Emeritus Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin–
Madison.
2 In CEE and the former Soviet Union, if 1989 GDP is given an index number of 100, 1998 estimated GDP is
only 72. But in the Czech Republic it is 95, in Poland 117, in Slovenia 103, in Slovakia 100, and in Hungary 95.
Meanwhile, the index number for Albania is 86, Bulgaria 65, Estonia 76, Latvia 58, Romania 76, Macedonia 58,
Russia 55, and the Ukraine 37 (Financial Times, “Outlook Gloomy for Former East Bloc,” 16 April 1999, p. 2).2
b)  social reasons: housing is a basic human need requiring a certain amount of government
involvement when markets fail;
c)  environmental reasons: the integration of the economy and the environment must include the
housing sector and related state and local decision-making in order to reduce the
consumption of resources, especially energy, water, and land; and
d)  political reasons: success or failure in housing policy is directly felt by the majority of the
population who tend to blame the government for shortages, lack of services, and other
difficulties occurring in the transition process.
Privatization in the CEE countries transferred publicly owned housing from the central to
local governments that, in turn, sold it to sitting tenants. Higher-income households were most
able to take advantage of this situation and to receive the windfall profits the process generated
through the heavily discounted sales pricing policies offered by government. Some poor
households elected not to participate in privatization and to continue renting because they
realized that they would not be able to afford the costs of maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation
that ownership would entail. Problems of inequality are thus becoming more serious as
privatization continues.
Meanwhile, rent controls for apartments still publicly owned were supposed to be lifted so
that proceeds could pay at least for their management and repair, but groups of organized tenants
are resisting the move in many CEE countries.
In some CEE countries the private housing construction sector has collapsed and lack of
adequate housing is affecting provision of dwelling space for the elderly, the new migrants to
cities, and young couples. Although unemployment is rampant in a number of CEE cities, lack of
housing is hampering the mobility of labor to the larger and more economically robust cities,
thus braking the industrialization process.
RADICAL PROCESS OR TRANSITION?
There is disagreement over how radical the privatization process in urban housing really is.
Some would call the process of attempting to determine a new balance between government
intervention and market forces a “transition,” but that implies a known end point or destination
and these new governments cannot foresee the future except to say that establishing a market
economy is the goal. Those who designate this change as a revolution probably over-state their
case while those who regard it as evolution are victims of understatement. Strong, Reiner, and
Szyrmer (1996, p. 237) believe the changes have been “tremendous” and “profound.” Douglas
takes exception suggesting that the Hungarian term that translates as “change of system” is most
appropriate (1997, p. 16). Yet in some CEE countries the change was more radical than in others.
In Hungary, a slow movement toward privatization began in 1983 and could have taken place as
early as 1968 when the private sector was legalized. For most countries in the region
privatization in the urban housing market began in earnest after the 1989–91 period. This paper
will refer to the ongoing process as “reform” and occasionally as “the transition.”3
ORGANIZATION OF PAPER
This paper begins by (1) describing the urban housing model of the CEE countries before
reform. It then (2) analyzes changes to that model that began with the privatization reforms in the
early 1990s. The article then (3) details the strengths and weaknesses of the reforms and (4)
suggests that there are some resource distribution inequities that are accentuated under reform. It
(5) discusses the pricing issues in urban housing reforms as well as the financing of urban
housing, and (6) briefly recounts matters related to mobility of labor, spatial issues of urban
housing development, urban infrastructure, peripheral urban growth, and titling and property
registration that have come about as state socialism is replaced by a more open market.
Four kinds of housing are referred to in this paper: (1) public rental housing, (2) private
rental housing, (3) owner-occupied housing, and (4) cooperative housing. They make up the vast
majority of urban housing tenure types in the CEE.
2. STATE SOCIALIST MODEL OF URBAN HOUSING
3
 The housing model adopted in CEE countries was derived from the Soviet model of state
socialism, altered to take some account of local institutions. Under state socialism the central
government provided infrastructure, acquired land and property, directly controlled and allocated
housing, and managed price controls. It also was in charge of more indirect controls such as
urban planning, setting building standards, writing and carrying out building codes, determining
levels of consumer subsidies, and administering property taxes.
Hegedüs and Tosics (1996, p. 15) argue that under state socialism, with few exceptions, a
common housing model developed in the CEE region and “[a]lthough each country had its own
housing system, all showed the same signs of crisis [in the 1980s]. We believe that behind the
very different East European housing systems there existed a common logic of housing policy,
which has established the ‘rules’ of behavior of the state and private sector, the state institutions,
and the various social and economic groups.”
One of the unresolved contradictions of this system was that in the effort to develop the
economy, so-called nonproductive sectors involving consumption were held back in order to
channel resources to medium-scale and heavy industry. One such nonproductive sector was
housing. However, the model imported from the Soviet Union to CEE carved out social
functions such as housing—with education, health care, and infrastructure—as a responsibility of
the state. Wages were set low because social functions were heavily subsidized by the state. The
costs of these social expenditures were often paid for with a tax or levy on enterprises, which
was redistributed through the state budget.
Sometimes employers provided housing more directly. There were differences among
countries on who paid the bill for housing, however. Hungary differs from countries like those in
the former Soviet Union (FSU) and much of the rest of CEE in that its employers did not pay for
much social housing. Hungarian enterprises sometimes made a lump-sum contribution to
                                               
3 This discussion draws heavily on Hegedüs and Tosics (1996, pp. 12–39).4
workers’ purchasing costs for housing, but these payments were modest in comparison to other
housing subsidies that came from government (Pudney 1995, p.75).
In Slovenia before 1990s’ reforms, financing was provided mostly from levies on firms’
incomes or profit and on private savings and bank loans. Taxes based on the firm’s total wage
bill were proposed by the municipality and were based on the housing needs of the community.
The firm retained part of the levy to provide for the housing needs of its workers. After reform
these taxes were abolished and sales of rental property to individuals were expected to generate
the revenue for new housing provision (Stanovnik 1994, pp. 2–3 of Internet version).
While demand for housing ran ahead of supply almost universally under state socialism,
some countries like Hungary had managed to close the gap somewhat by the 1980s. By tradition,
throughout the CEE region renters were almost never evicted. Furthermore, tenants’ rights
organizations were extremely powerful. The net result was that once a person secured a rental
unit s/he had it for life. These rental contracts were often also inheritable. As a social function
rent was generously subsidized by the state; rental payments often represented only 3 percent or
less of a household’s disposable income.
In state socialism, the market was replaced by central planning and a narrow political elite
made economic decisions. In practice in the CEE region this system was often modified by
pressures from groups, companies, or subordinate government institutions, which would then
call forth a dialogue amounting to “plan bargaining.” The bargaining and compromising often
meant that the government had to make its policies somewhat more flexible and responsive to
local needs than was its original inclination (Hegedüs and Tosics 1996, p 16).
  Consequently, a housing model based upon exclusion of the market, omission of housing
costs from income, and centralization of investment decisions was not realized in its pure form.
After all, the government had inherited much of its housing stock from the pre-socialist era.
While it was quite convenient to socialize large buildings, it was administratively not cost
effective to privatize all single family homes that existed from before World War II. Besides, the
political costs of this kind of complete nationalization would have been immense. Consequently,
in nearly all countries a substantial owner-occupied sector remained which was particularly
significant in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Slovenia. Where nationalization did not place, private
economic and social relations continued to influence the housing system.
Since it was impossible for governments to monitor all private transactions, it elected to turn
a blind eye to them. In practice, according to Hegedüs and Tosics (1996, p. 17), private
transactions were not limited to the exchange of privately owned apartments: in many CEE
countries cooperative or state-owned apartments were also involved in private transactions of
one kind or another (like apartment swapping).
 EVOLVING RIGHTS UNDER STATE SOCIALISM
It was also difficult for state socialism to exercise a monopoly in housing construction.
Prohibition of private construction caused political tensions, so the authorities often indirectly
influenced the building trades by limiting their supply of construction materials. In practice,
however, construction was not easy to regulate and became part of the underground economy.5
While in most CEE countries both the private and the public sectors were functioning
entities, the market was muted and did not determine allocation decisions; rather, feedback to the
system on allocation was supplied by growing political tensions. The changes in housing policy
such as relieving controls, increasing housing construction, or increasing subsidies took place
because of the mediation of political pressure (Hegedüs and Tosics 1996, p. 17).
Under state socialism property rights were not static between the end of World War II and
the end of the 1980s; they were constantly evolving. This section discusses some important
milestones in their development. Until the mid-1950s, the CEE countries were rebuilding in the
wake of wartime destruction. Soon thereafter a reduction of private rights to land and housing
occurred with more public housing rights being imposed. At this point there was a major
divergence between the CEE countries and the Soviet model. Most CEE countries rejected the
complete nationalization of land. Nevertheless, regulations put heavy restrictions on land use; for
example, a 1963 decree in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) made it compulsory to
obtain the permission of the local council for any activity that might be considered
developmental. The councils were bound to grant such permission only when members were
convinced that the transaction served the interest of the socialist state.
After the war a private rental sector remained strong in the majority of CEE countries.
However, gradual extension of control by local authorities over renting, including rent levels and
the obligatory accumulation of reserves for maintenance expenditures, severely discouraged
investment in the rental sector. Nationalization of parts of the private rental market occurred
gradually in CEE countries. Some individual dwellings that were privately owned became state
regulated. In Bulgaria, for example, where owner-occupied housing represented a higher
percentage of the total housing market than in any other CEE country, sales and purchases were
strictly controlled and often prohibited. In Czechoslovakia, regulations were not as strict: when a
privately built house was to be sold, the transaction was supervised by a government agency that
weighed in with price suggestions.
In the 1947–1956 period economic development surged forward, usually based on heavy
industries. The process created many jobs and generated significant population mobility that had
to be accommodated with housing. During the 1950s the housing situation deteriorated as in-
migration to cities outstripped housing supply. At the same time, however, the government was
not investing much in housing. The new elite and the working poor made up the most mobile
groups. To supply the former group, the state commandeered dwellings of those who left the
country after the war. Those pushed (or pulled) out of larger cities to go to decentralized
industries in more remote town and cities vacated apartments which were then used by the elite.
To accommodate those with housing needs, governments introduced new rules on space
restrictions. In Poland, new apartments were supposed to be between 22 and 58 square meters in
size; the upper limit was reduced to 44 square meters in 1959. Also introduced at this time in
Poland were regulations mandating that surplus quantities of living space could be expropriated.
Co-tenancies emerged at the time, with two families living in the space previously occupied by
one family.
The CEE countries renewed their rhetorical pledge to solve the housing problems toward the
end of the 1950s up to 1968 when a marked trend toward decentralization of government
functions took place. Uprisings in 1953 in the GDR and in 1956 in Hungary were taken as
serious warnings that the economic policy designed to hold back consumption was causing
political tension. Optimistic predictions of upturns in the economy caused some CEE leaders to6
promise more housing. Instead, however, the governments became more committed than ever to
industrialization at all cost and continued to tightly muzzle consumption. In Hungary, for
example, the government distributed nearly 4,000 building plots to alleviate political tension—
and then withdrew construction materials from the market, preventing the construction of
housing on them.
During the 1958–68 period housing cooperatives were either introduced or revived from an
earlier period. Housing co-ops operated on the principle that consumers participate in financing
new developments by making a down payment and providing a certain amount of self-
governance even though the state ultimately provided and maintained the housing. Often
members helped to construct the buildings. Hegedüs and Tosics (1996) believe that this
cooperative movement represented a state-sector compromise with the private sector. The price
of the cooperative unit, which was sold by state organizations such as savings banks or local
councils, was standard, not varying much according to location. Cooperative apartments were
allocated on the basis of waiting lists. In Poland and Hungary in the 1960s more people were
waiting for cooperative apartments than for state-rented ones since many middle-income people
earned above the income limits for state-rented housing. Supply of cooperative housing was
limited by the amount of finance from state banks given to developers. Development and
allocation of housing were under the control of the state exercised by local councils, state
enterprises, or other state agencies.
In the late 1960s decisions were made to build large-scale apartment blocks, called
“estates.” This construction, often on the edges of cities, used prefabricated techniques with
financing from abroad as the CEE countries were gradually opening up to the West. Construction
of these housing complexes began to grow rapidly in nearly all CEE countries. In Hungary
prefabricated housing units were begun in the 1970s, while in Czechoslovakia they began much
earlier. During the period 1969–80, in Czechoslovakia, the somewhat decentralized housing
policies of the earlier period were recentralized. This new rationalization was consistent with the
merger of industries, supposedly to realize new economies of scale, and the concomitant growth
of government. It was through the newly centralized administration that government
administered housing investments and subsidies. The motivation of this movement toward more
centralization of government was an attempt to limit private construction as much as possible. In
order to meet quantitative targets, the quality of new housing dropped as builders decreased
quality specifications and government introduced new regulations mandating smaller apartment
sizes.
The price paid by society for housing estates was very high. In the first place, demolition of
smaller dwellings where the estate was to be built displaced many other smaller dwellings. The
quality of the new units was often shoddy. Construction costs increased markedly due to the
increasing monopoly power of the construction industry. It was estimated that the concrete, steel,
and energy inputs for the construction panels would have yielded 70 percent more had traditional
techniques been used. Also criticized were the materials used—they were not as impervious to
cold weather as traditional building stock. Furthermore, the costs of shipping the enormous
building panels from factory to construction site was high (Hegedüs and Tosics 1996, p. 30).
The CEE countries differed in the ways they absorbed this new policy of centralization. The
GDR and Romania adhered slavishly to the policy and suppressed the private housing market
with a vengeance. Hungary adopted a more liberal and relaxed alternative, allowing a broader
role for private housing.7
The late 1970s and 1980s were characterized by economic crisis. In the West the crisis had
begun with the oil price increases of the early 1970s. By the end of the 1970s the petroleum
problems began to plague CEE. Housing expansion stopped in all CEE countries and each had to
decide how to cope with higher costs. Their decisions, in some cases, diverged quite markedly
from the earlier “CEE model.” In the GDR, politics did not let the crisis affect the housing sector.
It had a stronger economy and did not go into depression until the middle of the 1980s. In
Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, housing output was reduced.
In Hungary, in contrast, a series of reforms were adopted that gave more power to the
private housing sector. As a result, the secondary economy, which was legalized in 1968,
gradually turned into a legitimate private economy. The state restricted private participation in
industry and commerce but permitted it in housing. The housing policy of 1983 gave up
restricted control of the private housing market, withdrew some of the subsidy from the state-
owned sector, and applied it to the private sector. This resulted in stagnation of building in the
state sector and a short boom in private sector construction. Meanwhile, the elite was exerting
pressures for more private participation in housing. It wanted to convert its state-owned
apartments into private property at a subsidized price and, perhaps, trade up with the profits, an
opportunity it did not get until the early 1990s.
Nonetheless, the deepening economic crisis of the 1980s ultimately caused all the CEE
countries to drastically reduce their building programs. The poor and blue-collar workers
suffered most, countering the benefits they had gained from the extension of the housing subsidy
program to them during the housing boom of the 1970s. One of the features of the subsidy
program was that subventions were often attached to different types of housing rather than to
qualitative characteristics of the apartments or to the actual income of families. The very poor
tended to rent state-owned apartments, precisely the units whose building was curtailed most
drastically by the depression (Hegedüs and Tosics 1996, pp. 22–35).
Hegedüs and Tosics (1996, pp. 19–22) have pointed out that under state socialism,
individuals who wanted access to housing finance had basically two options. Either they could
work within the system (the voice option) or they could step out of the state sector and try to
achieve their goals in the private or the informal or the black market (the exit option). Working
within the system often meant renting a unit from the state. Indeed, in CEE a large number of
institutions (such as local councils, companies, ministries, etc.) distributed housing and provided
subsidies. A process of queuing—sometimes for years—was necessary to obtain an assignment
to these dwellings because of the large gap between supply and demand. In some countries, a
small amount of finance for new home construction was available through the state banking
system.
In some CEE countries, the economy’s emphasis on production rather than on consumption
meant that many households had forced savings, a source of demand that could not usually be
satisfied with the limited supply in informal markets. These forced savings made the exit option
possible. In Czechoslovakia, for example, sales and purchases of flats occurred, as did exchanges
of apartments before the recent reforms. These transactions were subject to the approval of the
local authorities.
One of the most typical ways of exercising the exit option was individual housing
construction. Housing built for future sale (speculative building) was prohibited until the mid-
1980s even though it was practiced. Individual self-building also existed in every CEE country.8
Local councils controlled the building-materials trade industry in the 1980s. But while the state
could restrict private housing construction, it could not prevent it completely. Building often took
place on plots controlled by relatives. While there was a shortage of building materials, some
leaked through state housing construction and others were available from demolition. Financing
was provided through forced savings.
In summary, the performance of the socialist CEE model is characterized by:
1)  inability to meet the demand for housing;
2)  shoddy construction of state-owned units;
3)  allocation of best apartments to the elite;
4)  distortions in prices which are caused by the black or informal markets;
5)  high cost and inefficient construction, allocation, and regulation;
6)  deferred maintenance and rehabilitation; and
7)  rents in state-owned apartments too low to cover maintenance and repair costs to say
nothing of new investment.
A further derivative problem is one that Tsenkova calls “hidden homelessness.” In Bulgaria
(and elsewhere in CEE) this shows up in large numbers of young couples living with their
parents (48 percent in 1985) not to mention the 10–15 year waiting period to buy or rent in an
urban area (Tsenkova 1996). In the Czech and Slovak Republics there are an estimated 200,000
sub-householders who would prefer to live in separate units but are now forced to live as a part
of a larger household because they cannot find or cannot afford a flat of their own (Kingsley and
Mikelsons 1996, pp. 187–188).
In the GDR at the time of reunification, Kohli and Kintrea (1996, p. 45) note that the cities
were characterized by “very poor housing conditions, decay and a lack of amenities in the prewar
stock, with cramped apartments in bleak and mostly under-maintained modern concrete
structures—pre-unification estimates were that 700,000 dwellings out of about 7 million were fit
only for demolition.” In Poland it is estimated that some 800,000 housing units should be
demolished while 500,000 to 600,000 are in need of major renovation (UNECE 1998a, p. xi). In
Hungary the accumulated backlog of deferred maintenance was 42 percent of the 1989 property
value (Daniel 1997, p. 148).
CASE OF ALBANIA UNDER STATE SOCIALISM
Prior to 1990, Albania could be characterized as a county striving to achieve self-sufficiency
through reliance on a command economy. Because Albania was the smallest and least populated
country of CEE, and due to its besieged history, government under state socialism believed that
only through self-reliance could the country attain autonomy. By the 1980s Albania was the most
collectivized and government-controlled country in Europe. One of the few exceptions to the ban
on private property was in housing, some 20–30 percent of which was built and owned privately.
During the days of rural collectivization, urbanization was slow. The proportion of the
national population residing in town was 29.5 percent in 1960, and this figure grew to only 34.6
percent in 1987. Agriculture dominated the economy during state socialism, employing half of9
the labor force. A system of internal passports helped to limit migration to cities, as did the
spatial boundary placed on the growth of cities whose limits were known as the “yellow line”
(Magnusson 1992, p. 13). The population growth rate in Albania under state socialism, however,
was high: the natural rate of population growth was 2.1 percent in the 1980s. Consequently, the
number of urban dwellers increased by almost a quarter over the 1979–89 period or over 110
percent since 1960, in spite of migration restrictions.
  There were three kinds of housing property during state socialism: rented flats, privately
owned family houses, and cooperatively owned flats. Most of the dwellings in urban Albania and
on state farms were owned and built by the state or by voluntary groups; in villages individuals
built their own houses. The voluntary labor movement began in Tirana in 1968 during the
“Cultural Revolution.” The state provided building materials and specialists and those who were
going to inhabit the housing units provided the labor.
The urban housing situation in Albania was arguably the poorest of all CEE countries
governed under state socialism. The prewar buildings that survived were mainly owner-occupied
row houses and single family houses without indoor plumbing. While some home ownership
was permitted under state socialism, large dwellings had to be subdivided and shared with rental
tenants chosen by municipal authorities. The apartment buildings that existed were expropriated
and administered by the state as rental housing. Several thousand privately owned dwellings
were confiscated for political reasons, but the government did allow a few hundred dwellings
under strict regulation to be built each year for private use (Lowry 1993, p. 2).
During 45 years of state socialism, as urban population grew the state responded by building
thousands of 5- and 6-story apartment houses that were managed as state housing. Some state-
owned enterprises also sponsored cooperative dwellings for their employees; they were financed
by bank loans to be repaid by tenants. Sometimes single family units were confiscated and
demolished, making way for apartment estates (high-rise apartment blocks). Similar estates were
built on the urban fringes as in most CEE and FSU countries. By 1989 the state owned about
22,000 residential buildings in urban areas containing over 200,000 individual dwellings. In
addition, urban cooperatives and privately owned 1- and 2-family houses accounted for 54,000
buildings containing 86,000 dwellings. About 40 percent of the private dwellings and perhaps 10
percent of the public ones predated 1945 (Lowry 1993, p. 3).
Approximately 70 percent of all urban housing was state-owned by 1990 and occupied by
renters. Government set rents at a very low level—rental income could not cover maintenance
and repairs. Lowry (1993, p. 3) reported that “with the exception of a few villas built or
remodeled for high officials of the government, the state-owned apartment blocks are the best
urban housing in Albania. At the same time they are very nearly the worst housing in Europe.”
Rent and utility expenses amounted to only about 4.5 percent of a typical family’s income.
Income from one or two days of work was usually sufficient to pay the month’s rent. The
payment made for utilities like water and electricity was largely symbolic. Eviction was nearly
impossible—even if renters defaulted on their payments. Families were assigned dwellings in
order of their priority on a waiting list.
The housing stock in urban Albania consisted of older buildings of brick laid in a framework
of reinforced concrete with poured-slab floors. Some recent buildings were assembled on site
from prefabricated, reinforced concrete panels. About half were built with volunteer labor under
the supervision of state building authorities. The buildings contained 20 to 50 apartments.10
According to Lowry (1993, p. 3), “They have received very little maintenance since their
completion. Exteriors are badly weathered; entries and interior common areas lack the simplest
amenities of paint, electric light, or regular cleaning. Approaches to the buildings are typically
unpaved, muddy, and garbage strewn. To western eyes, many of the apartment blocks look
uninhabitable.”
Over time there had been some improvement in Albania’s urban housing. During the 1950s
a typical unit consisted of two bedrooms, a very small kitchen area, and an unequipped area
plumbed for bathroom use. Apartments built in the 1980s consisted of one or two bedrooms, a
general-purpose area used for a living room and for dining, a larger kitchen, and an enclosed area
equipped with a toilet and shower. No central heating system was provided nor plumbing for hot
water. Often there was a small balcony which tenants enclosed for use as another room. Each
room usually had one electrical socket and an overhead light. In general apartments are small and
crowded. After the collapse of state socialism, about 13,300 urban apartments were under
construction and left unfinished. Squatters, usually those working on the building at the time,
occupied those with walls and roofs. The others were abandoned to do-it-yourself builders
seeking materials (Lowry 1993, pp. 3–4).
Since a high percentage of the population reach adulthood each year, housing did not keep
up with demand during the days of state socialism. Several factors, however, dampened housing
demand. One is the fact that families with only 1 to 2 people represent a small percentage of total
households. In the rest of Europe these small households make up from one-third to two-thirds of
the housing market. In Albania they make up only 9.5 per cent, mostly elderly people because in
Albania young people usually live with their parents until they marry. Additionally, under state
socialism single young people were not allowed to enter the housing market. In 1989, 18.2
percent of the families in Albania were made up of two couples living under one roof. This is in
line with the tradition that the oldest son or daughter takes care of the parents and shares a
dwelling with them. Even though family size decreased somewhat in the 1980s, household size
seemed to be still about 6 to 7 persons by the early 1990s (Magnusson 1992, pp. 15–18).
Nonetheless, as in other CEE countries, the combination of low rents, substantial subsidies, and a
low level of housing construction was producing social and financial strains toward the end of
the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s (Sjöberg 1992, pp. 6–9).
From 1950 until the beginning of the 1990s the state distributed some loans for those who
wished to build their own homes. Loans were also available for those who wanted to repair or
rehabilitate their homes. New rules in 1990 allowed different loan amounts for urban and rural
residents. Families living on state farms could get the equivalent of about US$3,500, while those
in urban areas could get US$2,500. The subsidized interest rate was 6 percent and the borrower
could repay over 20 or 25 years. Both types of loans are intended to cover not more than 50
percent of building costs. The informal economy was used to obtain a number of materials. Land
availability for housing also rose: in the cities, 150 square meters were allowed; in the
countryside, 200 square meters were permitted; and in mountainous areas, 300 square meters
could be obtained.
In 1990 it was decided in Albania that housing prices should better reflect supply and
demand and some subsidies should be eliminated. Agreements that would allow more self-
building of flats by groups (cooperative housing schemes) were again encouraged. In 1992 the
decollectivization process began and rural-to-urban migration sped up greatly. Much of the urban
pressure today is in peripheral areas immediately adjacent to major urban centers.11
3. REFORMS OF THE HOUSING SYSTEM: THE CEE MODEL
REVISED
Recent changes in the CEE region have introduced a commitment to the free market and
considerable deregulation in housing provision systems, accompanied by privatization of the
state construction industry and a massive sale of public housing (Tsenkova 1996). The level of
state ownership was different in each of the CEE countries so the privatization effort also varied.
In Hungary the state sector accounted for 20 percent of housing stock in 1989, in Bulgaria 9




During the course of privatization, monopolistic state management agencies were often replaced
by other entities such as competitive private organizations of management. In all CEE countries
the privatization of urban housing and the retreat of the state from the housing sector in general
has been considered positive and necessary (Douglas 1997, p. 16). What this has meant in
practice is that there has been a general withdrawal of government from the production of
subsidized housing and a relaxation of rental price controls as well as a government retreat from
regulations over home ownership, private rentals, and nonprofit housing. But this does not mean
that the government has left urban housing completely to the free market. In some CEE countries
a few subsidies and housing allowances are still being given, but at a much lower level. Some
governments are also better targeting them to groups in the most need.
Douglas (1997, p. 17) claims that the retreat of government from the housing sector is “one
of the cornerstones of the whole transformational process…. Even where the state has retained
some responsibility for housing allocation, maintenance or management, this responsibility is
being continually devolved to more local levels, public-private partnerships, or private
companies and individual households.” The reasons for privatization seem to depend more on
the multiple shortcomings of the old system rather than proven merits of the private system.
Douglas argues that a two-track model might work better than the present directional shift of
nearly 180 degrees to the free market. The encouragement, or at least not the discouragement, of
public tenure that can compete with the private rental and owner-occupied tenure characterizes
the model he suggests. According to Douglas, this model would have the potential to prevent
market failure and such problems as speculation, extremely unequal distribution of housing
resources, and the lack of provision of housing to the poor.
WHY PRIVATIZE?
Perhaps it was felt that a radical break with the past should be favored, but for whatever the
reason, privatization that favored the free market was the chosen vehicle to establish the new
housing system in CEE countries. The World Bank (1991) favors all-encompassing privatization
and its opinions were crucial in the decisions of many CEE governments. Bank experts
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believe privatization is motivated by three broad objectives: (1) to increase economic efficiency
at the level of the market, (2) to raise revenue for government activities, and (3) to improve
distribution.
Moving from a planned economy, where housing was an underpriced, centrally provided
commodity, to a market system, where scarcity of resources is reflected through price signals,
has resulted in adjustment problems. New structures, institutions, and processes need to be put
into place to organize and control the process of decentralized decision making.
The political results of privatization may be as important as the economic rationale. The
process of privatization that makes some members of the working class homeowners can change
class structure and class alliances; as workers become owners with property to defend, they may
become more conservative in their attitudes and even their voting patterns. Furthermore,
homeowners may be more motivated than renters to improve their properties when they realize
they have a stake in the system being created.
STEPS TO REFORM
Banks et al. (1996) believe that the privatization strategies of a number of countries (they use the
examples of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania) in the EEC are similar even though there
are always some country differences. This section will discuss three aspects of the housing
reform process: decentralization, privatization, and deregulation.
Decentralization
The decentralization of housing, construction, and management involves the transfer from state
to local government of ownership, management, and financial responsibility for the housing
stock with a corresponding decline of central subsidies for construction, utilities, and
management. Struyk (1996, p. 20) concludes of the process of urban housing reform in the CEE
countries, “Possibly the clearest pattern across countries has been the twin development of early
decentralization of the ownership of state housing from the national to the local governments and
the enactment and implementation of privatization programs under which sitting tenants have the
right to claim ownership of their flat at low or no cost.” This implies, of course, the reallocation
of costs (for operations, management, repair, and rehabilitation) to the local level. More
importantly, the central government saw decentralization as a way to relieve itself of the onerous
burden of subsidies, which it could no longer afford to pay. On a more positive note, when the
responsibility of this sector is devolved to local authorities, a better match may be struck between
services and consumer preferences.
Struyk (1996, pp. 20–22) believes that sometimes decentralization went too far. In Budapest
the responsibility was devolved from the city level to the city’s 22 districts, which resulted in
different parts of the city having different policies on rentals in state housing and in the form of
housing subsidy assistance to lower-income groups. There were instances of poorer people
moving to the district with the more generous subsidies. To promote consistency some of this
devolved authority was restored to the municipality.
Hungary and Slovakia were early starters. Hungary set the stage for privatization in its
legislation in 1968 and 1983. Ownership of the stock was then transferred from the state to
municipalities in 1991. This devolution was accompanied by a cut in subsidies for maintenance13
and utilities. Slovakia took a similar path. In Romania, however, housing passed to sitting tenants
without going through the local government. Housing subject to restitution is still under state
control there.
  In Bulgaria, the process again was somewhat distinct. The United Nations points out that its
housing adjustment problems suffer from two major paradoxical problems. One is that the
government has, during the transition process, withdrawn from most practical and economic
responsibilities for housing. The second is that no delegation of authority from centralized state
to local government has been made. The result is very weak or nonexistent political and
administrative structures for the formulation and execution of housing policy at the local level.
Local governments are limited to allocating vacant public housing units to households on a state-
regulated waiting list (which contains 89,000 names) according to state-regulated criteria at state-
regulated rents (UNECE 1996, p. ix). The Economic Commission for Europe recommends that
the government of Bulgaria establish shared authority and responsibility for housing between the
central and local governments (UNECE 1996, pp. x, 10).
Privatization
The privatization of housing in CEE has generally involved the transfer of ownership from local
governments to the sitting tenants with a legally mandated right to purchase under favorable
conditions—below market prices, small down payment, minimal interest rate, and long payback
schedules. Furthermore, the functions of operation and management were turned over to the new
owners. In some other countries, if sitting tenants do not wish to purchase, the local government
may sell the property to another private person who becomes the renter’s landlord. This also
happens with restituted property which sitting tenants are not allowed to purchase.
Governments sacrificed a large amount of revenue by generously subsidizing the sale price
of these properties. Typically, approximately one-fourth of dwelling units are in the state rental
sector in CEE, and hence they represent a major asset to the municipal government, which in the
transition is starved for capital resources. Receipts from sales might have been recycled back into
housing or infrastructure, or to reduce budget deficits until a reliable tax system could be devised
and put in place (Katsura and Struyk 1991, pp. 1251–73). Furthermore, there is the issue of
equity: why should renters be singled out for generous subsidies that are not available to other
citizens.
In Poland, privatization began in the 1970s. However, by 1988 local governments had sold
only 5 percent of the state-owned stock. Privatization has continued at a modest but increasing
pace with 13 percent of the stock privatized by 1994 (Banks et al. 1996, p. 139). The elimination
of state construction and finance subsidies was replaced by a market system of finance that
would encourage the growth of mortgage and construction finance (see later section on finance,
p. 31) in the early 1990s (Banks et al. 1996).
In Slovakia, it is estimated that three-fourths of the state-owned housing stock will
eventually be sold. Most local governments plan to retain 20–25 percent for social purposes. By
the end of 1995, 10 percent of the stock had been sold. Most of the publicly owned stock in
Romania was sold: 90 percent in most cities between 1990 and 1992. In the Czech Republic
private ownership represented 60 percent of all dwellings in 1991. In Bulgaria, a country with
widespread owner-occupancy before the present reforms, the comparable figure was 95 percent
in 1993 (Strong, Reiner, and Szyrmer 1996, pp. 243–44).14
There was sporadic privatization of public housing in Hungary previously but the process
began to move rapidly in 1990. In January 1990 there were 721,000 dwellings in public
ownership, 396,000 in Budapest. This represented 18.7 percent of the stock in the country and
46.6 percent in Budapest. By 1995, government had sold 500,000 rental dwellings. The vast
majority of housing previously in public ownership will have become private property before
2000 (Daniel 1997, pp. 147–48). Some feel that in Hungary overprivatization of the state stock
of rental property may be jeopardizing the vitality of the future rental sector (Douglas 1997).
Some students of the CEE urban housing market have urged that governments preserve a
flexible and competitive rental sector. Rental housing gives some flexibility to the housing
system. If there are too few remaining rental apartments, young families will have no place to
reside until they can become owners, those moving into the city will encounter a housing
scarcity, and the homes of the elderly will be jeopardized.
Households in Hungary reported two strong motives for buying: to acquire the value of the
property—the difference between the value of the flat as owner-occupied and its value under the
state rental system—and to obtain a secure position within the system when controlled rents
would end. The control over maintenance was a less important reason for buying. Those who
elected not to buy were motivated by two factors also. First, they lacked financial means, and
second, they cited the rundown nature of the housing—its low value as an investment (Hegedüs,
Mark, and Tosics 1996, p. 119).
A high proportion of existing housing stock was sold very cheaply in Hungary as in most of
CEE. Apartment units that were renovated in the last 15 years received an 85 percent discount
and those renovated between 10 and 15 years ago got a 70 percent discount. Besides, the
installment contract is long—20 to 30 years—and a nonadjustable interest rate of 3 percent is
offered.
In an effort to be more just and not to benefit only those who were renters, the Baltic
countries accomplished privatization with certificates (vouchers) for which all households were
eligible. In Estonia, for example, each family member is given voucher units in proportion to the
number of years he or she has worked, time spent in professional schools or universities, number
of children, and time spent in a Siberian detention camp. Each voucher buys 1 square meter of
average quality housing space.
If the family does not have enough vouchers to purchase the dwelling in which it is the
tenant, a government loan would be available at 17 percent. This is also a subsidized amount as
inflation fluctuated between 30 and 50 percent in the early-to-mid 1990s. The need for loans
should be minimal as the government has issued 40 million vouchers and the number of square
meters of government-owned housing stock is 18.5 million. Should the vouchers not be needed
for housing, they are somewhat fungible and may be used for buying shares in industry or a
pension fund. The three Baltic countries are privatizing buildings without land, a problem that is
likely to cause future problems with the formation of condominiums and with a new owner’s
sense of security (Turner and Victorin 1996, pp. 355–57).
In 1991 Albania joined other CEE counties in the transition to a market-based economy by
privatizing state-owned properties. The effort was begun with the sale of retail store space,
businesses, and vacant land. A law passed in December 1992 enables the occupants of most
state-owned dwellings, both apartments and single-family houses, to claim ownership title to
their dwellings by registering their claim with the district Banesi (state housing enterprise). And15
1993 saw the beginning of a program of restitution and compensation of pre-state socialism
owners of urban real estate and the privatization of state enterprises and business space.
Lowry (1993, p. 1) reports that the first dwellings in Albania were privatized in April 1993;
by early October the occupants of more than 196,000 housing units—91 of the state-owned
housing stock—had applied for titles of ownership and 139,000 had paid the requisite
privatization fees. In Albania, state-owned urban dwellings were sold to their tenants for prices
that varied with dwelling size and quality, but were only a fraction of potential market value.
Those who did not live in state-owned dwellings were vaguely promised other housing
assistance.
About 50,000 older and smaller dwellings were to be transferred free of charge. About
150,000 newer, larger, and better-quality housing units were transferred subject to a schedule of
fairly nominal fees promulgated by ministerial decree. The fee could be paid in lump sum or
installments over a term that was negotiated. Each privatized building was to be registered in the
name of all the adult members of the household who are co-owners. For a dwelling occupied by
more than one family, each family receives an undivided share in proportion to its share of the
rental contract. When all tenants (whether or not more than one family) agree, the title can be
registered as the property of one household head (Lowry 1993, pp. 5–6).
The land occupied by a privatized dwelling is also transferred to the new owners. In the case
of a multiple-unit dwelling, only the site occupied by the building (its footprint) plus a border 1
meter wide will be transferred. This unit of land becomes the joint-property of the owners of
individual apartments. In the case of a single-family dwelling that is surrounded by a garden that
has been permanently used and maintained by the tenants, the garden is included in the transfer.
An additional fee for the land is charged pursuant to a schedule of urban land prices set by the
Council of Ministers (Lowry 1993, p. 6).
Owners of privatized buildings in Albania have the immediate right to sell, rent, or mortgage
their properties but only those who have single-family dwellings will gain control of and
responsibility for repair and maintenance (Lowry 1993, p. 5). The law on the privatization of
state housing does not discuss the management of multiple-family apartment buildings expecting
that the residents will work out among themselves how the building is to be kept in good repair
and common expenses paid.
In some countries privatization programs moved more slowly than in others because of
insecure systems of property rights, uncertainties as to the rights and obligations of ownership,
the presence of nominal rents with secure tenure and strong tenant’s organizations to enforce it,
an undeveloped real estate market, and poor stock condition. The new owners, it was understood,
would have to repair the buildings from their own incomes or savings (Banks et al. 1996,
pp. 139–40). This cost, which might have been prohibitive for the very poor given the backlog of
repairs that needed to be made, worked to deter some public renters from buying their
municipally owned flats. Notably Poland, the Baltic Republics, and the Czech and Slovak
Republics were slower to privatize their urban residential stock than Slovenia, Hungary, Albania,
Romania, and Bulgaria.
Another aspect of privatization is the turnover of operation and management of the
apartments to the private sector. In Romania since 1977 the state-owned housing stock has been
managed by associations of tenants rather than by state (or now private) maintenance companies
as in most other countries. The administrator of the association collects rent, mortgage payments,16
and utility fees based on the proportionate space the owner or renter occupies. Capital repairs and
routine management are made by contractors hired by the administrator and paid for by
residents.
In the Czech and Slovak Republics, the old state management agencies were monopolistic,
inefficient, and paid little attention to tenant complaints. Reforming them has been a popular
theme among the region’s local officials. One district in Prague terminated all of the functions of
the state management agency and publicly requested proposals from private firms to fill the
breach, fully aware at the time that no such firms existed. Firms were literally created overnight
and ultimately 25 new firms answered the government request. Not all were qualified, but 19
were contracted to manage the 6,041 units in the district’s social sector. After 6 months a formal
review was undertaken and 3 firms were terminated because they did not perform satisfactorily.
Fifty additional firms responded to the government’s second request and the government picked
5 to be retained. District officials feel the experiment was successful in that these private firms
proved to be more efficient than the state firm and tenants said they were satisfied with the
services they provided (Kingsley and Mikelsons 1996, pp. 199–200).
In Hungary, prior to 1990, 36 large management companies operated 83 percent of the
public housing stock. In 1990 the central state subsidy for management companies was
eliminated and the corporate law required local governments to restructure their enterprises as
joint-stock companies. An examination of these companies in 1991 showed that most companies
had made streamlining changes to these organizations, including breaking them into several
companies (Hegedüs, Mark, and Tosics 1996, pp. 123–24).
In Slovenia, there was a rapid privatization of management services. Prior to housing
privatization, only a small number of local monopoly firms had been vested various powers by
the owners of housing stock, be they firms, municipalities, or private individuals. These firms
collected the rent and managed the housing stock. After 1991 the municipal maintenance firms
were privatized and a large number of new firms emerged to compete for contracts with the older
firms. An assessment of these new firms’ performance remains to be done (Mandic and
Stanovnik 1996, p. 165).
Deregulation
Deregulation of the nonprivatized rental sector includes phase out of rental control, institution of
housing allowances, allowing prices of utilities and energy to rise, and diminution of tenant’s
rights (Banks et al. 1996, pp. 138–39). If rents cannot be raised, outside buyers will not have an
incentive to purchase because they will not be able to realize a profit from the venture. Also if
sitting tenants perceive that rents will be decontrolled, they may protect themselves by
purchasing their dwelling.
There is still a substantial publicly owned rental sector in some CEE countries. Government
generally maintains control of this housing. In Poland, however, local governments are allowing
more autonomy. Where more local control is allowed, it is understood that rents will have to be
raised so that maintenance and repairs can be covered. There is the feeling in some countries that
if rents are raised tenants will not be able to afford them. In Hungary and Poland, a means test
has accompanied measures to raise the rent. Subsidies and housing allowances are provided if
the renters cannot afford the new rents. Slovakia is considering similar measures. Evictions in the
case of rental default was difficult under state socialism because of the stipulation that mandated17
the landlord to provide evicted tenants with alternative housing which must meet certain
standards. In Hungary and Poland, alternative-housing provision is no longer required, and in
Slovakia, standards for alternative housing have been lowered. Even so, tenant associations are
often still strong and will presumably protest vigorously on behalf of a tenant threatened with
eviction.
In Albania, as in most CEE countries, occupants of state-owned housing were not obliged to
become owners. Albanian tenants were warned, however, that rents will soon be raised to cover
the full costs of administering and maintaining the housing. This is reinforced by articles of the
housing privatization law that state that rents for both state-owned and privately owned dwellings
will be reviewed every six months and that rent controls on privately owned buildings will soon
be abolished. Chances are that warning was an extra incentive for such a huge majority of
Albanian renters to become owners.
Telgarsky et al. (1993) conclude that in Czechoslovakia tenants pay a very small fraction of
their incomes for rent and at a level considerably below that needed to cover maintenance and
operating expenses. Enormous subsidies need to be given to make up the difference. Since 1989,
both of the republics have realized that rents will have to increase markedly if accelerated
deterioration of these units is to be avoided.
While most poor people live in rental units in Czechoslovakia, richer families also rent and
they could afford to pay higher rents without straining their budgets. Telgarsky (1993) and his
colleagues analyze data that show that distribution of income in rental housing is very similar to
that in the nation as a whole. These data reveal that 94 percent of renters could afford 100
percent increases in their rent without spending more than 15 percent of their income for rent.
Housing subsidies would then be needed to prevent the other 6 percent from exceeding their
budgets by 15 percent. The study concludes that it should be possible to increase rents to cover
adequate building operation and maintenance while at the same time reducing government
outlays for social housing. This argues for housing allowances that are strictly targeted at the
poor and not simply and arbitrarily attached to certain kinds of housing units. Rent increases will
be difficult politically, but if the public knows that only the rich—who have benefited from large
and inequitable subsidies in the past—face steep increases, they may accept them. The general
public is presently unhappy that renters receive so many subsidies not available to those who live
in cooperative or family housing.
RESTITUTION AND COMPENSATION
Most CEE countries have allowed for the restitution of pre-socialist era urban dwellings to their
previous owners. In principle, returning the property to former owners should be a simple and
straightforward process. In reality, it is not. First, it is not always easy to establish what property
was unlawfully taken. Second, deciding on the type and level of compensation to be paid to the
former owner if the property cannot be returned—and if the property has been changed
substantially—can be complicated. For example, some properties were farmland before state
socialism and now they may be part of the city suburbs and dwellings may have been built on
them. Land that has been transformed and cannot be returned may be eligible for compensation.
Ideally, restitution should precede privatization. The matter of ownership should first be
clarified. Otherwise privatization seems meaningless.18
In Estonia, the process of restitution has been slow; former owners or their descendants have
claimed more than 12,000 buildings; some 167,000 tenants live in them. Restitution cannot be
made on all of them and that means that compensation must be paid on legitimate claims. In
Estonia, compensation may be given as bonds, as privatization certificates (vouchers), or in cash.
From the time of the restitution legislation in 1991 until mid-decade, 20 percent of claims had
been paid. Part of the problem is that Estonia does not have a functional property registry.
The restitution process is likely to cause tensions between the new owners and renters. In
Estonia, it is possible to evict tenants if it can be shown that the new owners need the building as
housing for themselves. Or the new owner can find an alternative flat for the tenant.
Theoretically, the restitution process does not affect the contract between the landlord and the
tenant; in fact, it does. Legislated rents are so low that old restituted owners cannot make money
on them. Sometimes the apartment needs so much renovation that the property may be a liability.
While government has attempted to protect renters, new owners have every incentive to try to
evict the sitting tenant. Tenants may be elderly people living on fixed and low pensions, just able
to meet the highly subsidized rental payments each month. A study of what has become of
renters in the case of restitution is needed.
In Latvia, the tenants are given seven years of security in the restituted building or the new
owner has to find an alternative dwelling for them. When a restituted flat is vacated, the owner
can sell it. Again, however, sales are discouraged in Latvia by the lack of a functional property
register (Turner and Victorin 1996, pp. 351–55).
In Slovenia, in 1991 parliament passed the Restitution Act that granted private owners the
right to property that had been expropriated by the socialist regime. The act included all kinds of
property including 13,000 dwellings, and it provided that claimants or their heirs could exercise
one of two options. They could either obtain the property itself or they could obtain state bonds
that could not be cashed in before 2005. The second option did not work out well; most elected
to be compensated in kind and not in bonds. Sitting tenants in a unit claimed for restitution have
caused conflict. Giving the tenants recompense for moving out resolved some cases. But if the
tenants did not want to leave, they were given a permanent lease and controlled rent, a situation
anathema to the restituted owner. Purchase of the unit by the tenant was an option only if the
restituted owner wanted to sell (for other renters of state-owned housing the option to buy was a
right), in which case the government would pay the owner the difference between the book and
the market value.… Most, however, did not want to sell the property to the sitting tenants. In
response, feeling a sense of injustice, tenants formed an organization and appealed to the
constitutional court. Making it possible for a renter of restituted property to buy the flat of
another renter who decided not to purchase the apartment finally solved the issue (Mandic and
Stanovnik 1996, pp. 165–67).
In the Czech and Slovak Republics, where the economies were somewhat more dynamic
and housing problems were not as serious as in most of the CEE countries, restitution went
relatively smoothly. Here also tenants who could not be easily evicted often occupied restituted
buildings. Furthermore, rents are controlled at low levels. The newly restituted private owners
are obligated to maintain buildings regardless of how much rent they collect. That so many have
accepted their restituted property regardless of the fact that they will make few short-run profits
reflects their optimism that market reform will soon be effective (Kingsley and Mikelsons 1996,
p. 192).19
In Bulgaria, restitution continues to be a subject of much political disagreement. During its
brief tenure, the Union of Democratic Forces party succeeded in passing a restitution law for
farmlands and for urban properties. In a few years the country was able to restitute over 56
percent of the urban structures and enterprises that were subject to valid claims. Because of the
large number of owner-occupied dwellings prior to transition, the major problems of restitution
lay in the agricultural sector where most properties were subject to such claims. Only 55,000
restitution claims were made in urban areas while in rural areas there were 1.7 million.
Government projections that restitution would be complete by 1995 were not realized because of
delays mainly due to judicial decisions on contested boundaries, delays in the issuance of titles,
and government recalcitrance.
In urban areas of Bulgaria, restitution is provided if the property taken was a building and if
that building still exists and is the same size as when taken or if the property taken was land and
if the land is suitable for single-housing construction. The major difficulty with these legal
provisions is the one that requires buildings to be the same size as when expropriated. Some
buildings have been demolished and new ones now exist. In addition, the ownership
documentation required is sometimes lacking. A later law was supposed to be enacted to provide
compensation in these cases, but as of the mid-1990s no legislation had been issued on the
subject. As of mid-1995, 63 percent of the housing claimed had been restituted. Tenants on
restituted property were initially authorized to remain for three years, payments for rent now
going to the private owner (at very low government-set rates). In February 1995, the right of
tenants to continue to occupy their homes was extended another three years, but the
constitutional court ruled this provision unconstitutional (Strong, Reiner, and Szyrmer 1996, pp.
41–46).
CONDOMINIUMS OR PROPERTY OWNER ASSOCIATIONS
5
Experts in the field indicate that three legal issues are fundamental to operating a condominium
or property owner association: all owners should be required to belong, the association should
have the right to act as a legal entity, and registration procedures must establish title to the
property and legal authority to the association. Without this framework the new owners would
not have the financial, legal, and technical tools that are necessary for meeting the demands of
joint ownership of an apartment complex. When property owner associations can act as a legal
entity the association can assure its members that they have protected property and contract
rights. As a legal entity the association can enter into contracts with service providers, pay
common expenses, make binding joint decisions, and so on. In Hungary and Poland property
owner associations are required in all privatized housing buildings. In Poland, however, it is not
clear that property owner associations are legal entities. In Slovakia property owner associations
are an option. The other option is that the joint membership of the building can enter into
agreement with a private management company for maintenance services.
In condominiums in Hungary all maintenance or renovation work must be approved by a
majority of the members. Decisions need not be unanimous except in buildings with fewer than
six dwellings. There are many barriers to the renovation of a building. The obvious one is
financing: it must be accomplished with the members’ savings or from a loan. To obtain a loan
                                               
5 This section draws heavily from Banks et al. (1996).20
each of the members must mortgage their own dwelling, so all must agree on the level of costs
and be able to qualify for a loan. Because of low incomes, the elderly or the unemployed may not
qualify for a loan and this might scuttle the plans of the entire project. These poorer households
find it difficult even to pay the monthly condominium common expense fee (for heating, water,
elevator, etc.). In addition to those who have financial problems, there will always be some who
do not wish to participate in any type of rehabilitation program regardless of cost. In order for
rehabilitation to proceed in these instances the local government might give some assistance. Or
liens could be placed on the dwellings of these recalcitrant but financially able members and
their monthly fee could be increased to reflect their portion of costs. Still others may have to sell
out and buy more affordable housing elsewhere (Douglas 1997, p. 81).
Since nearly all residential buildings in Budapest are now privatized and under
condominium law, a sharp increase in segregation by income group seems to be occurring. The
majority of medium- and higher-income families’ dwellings have been quickly privatized and
most members have voted for a higher management fee. There is a tendency under this
arrangement for poor families to be pushed out because they cannot afford the higher fee. While
there is still a noneviction tradition in Hungary, the existence of the condominium law may lead
to more gentrification in the future.
The issue of common expenses is a knotty one in Hungary. Newly formed condominium
associations can vote not to have a fund for common expenses and previously organized
condominiums can vote to do away with such a fund. A plethora of lawsuits exist against these
associations, but presently a contractor who performs work for a condominium cannot collect
from it if it elects not to pay. Contractors are now demanding their money up-front, the result
being that a smaller amount of renovation is done (Douglas 1977, p. 82).
Registration of the condominium is one of the most difficult problems in instituting
privatization laws. Two kinds of registration are needed to establish a functioning condominium:
the first is registration of the individual apartments, each with its share of the common property,
and the second is registration of the ownership association. The first is handled in the real
property registration office or the cadastral office, and the second is usually under the authority
of the court system. To register the property owner association, a special document called a
charter or an association agreement is needed. This latter document is a contract among the
owners setting out the rights and responsibilities of members and binding them to condominium
laws. Even in the presence of a condominium law registration presents difficulties. In Slovakia
there is at least a one-year backlog for registration. During the interim owners’ rights are in
doubt. Some questions that remain unclear are: Can new owners sell their flats? Do they continue
paying rent to the municipality? The primary obstacle is the fee that may range up to US$1,000
charged by notaries to authorize the registration documents. Legislation pending provides for
free registration, but it is doubtful that the work of the private notaries can be dispensed with.
Most privatization programs in CEE permit individual units in multi-family buildings to be
privatized—it is not necessary for a certain percentage of tenants in a building to apply for
privatization before the process can begin. With the exception of at least the Czech and Slovak
Republics, Poland, and Hungary, a property owner association (condominium association) does
not need to be in place before sales can begin. The effect of unit-by-unit privatization is that new
owners receive attenuated property rights: they receive the rights to dispose of their property
freely but they do not receive control of the management of their building. Management remains
with the state firm until an association of owners is formed. Shared ownership between the21
municipality (of the units that have not been sold) and private owners tends to create knotty
governance problems (Struyk 1996, pp. 26–27).
One problem is that while condominium laws are passed on a national level they are
administered locally. There may not be shared interests between local and national levels on this
score. Furthermore, local governments remain responsible for buildings that are unsold and
apartments that have not been privatized. They are also responsible for those enterprises that do
maintenance on the condominiums. The responsibility that the local government has in a
building that is only partially privatized is often unclear.
Sometimes the condominium law provides guidelines in cases that a building has mixed
ownership, but more often it does not. A major problem arises over what should be done if the
owners get together and want to institute rehabilitation but the government does not have funds
to contribute. Likewise it is often unclear as to whether the municipal owner is to pay the
monthly condominium fee or contribute to the rehabilitation fees, and how many votes the
municipality has when the association is making decisions.
According to the Estonian Privatization Act, any residential building with five or more
owners shall establish a community of flat owners for “joint possession and usage.” The
municipality will remain the owner of all unsold flats. Also provided is that the municipality will
be a member of the association with only one vote (despite its probable ownership of more than
one unit). One can easily imagine a situation in which a group of tenants, now controlling the
majority of votes, is in a position to make financial decisions that will commit the municipality to
a spending program for rehabilitation that it cannot and should not afford. While this accords
with the cooperative principle of “one member one vote,” it is untenable over the long run
(Turner and Victorin 1996, pp. 358–59).
Therefore, it is often in the local government’s interest to clarify the situation by privatizing
as much of any given building as is possible, a step that often proves difficult, as some renters are
wary of any new situation. In some countries municipalities are willing to give generous price
discounts for the complete privatization of units in a given building. In Krakow a 90 percent
price discount is given if all families in a building agree to privatize. Discounts of around 50
percent are given in Kosice, Slovakia, the exact percentage depending on the number in a
building who wish to privatize (Banks et al. 1996, p. 145).
One of the consequences of the speedy privatization process in Albania is that buildings
were privatized before condominiums were created. Under these circumstances the state was
unable to establish the condominium because it was no longer the owner of the property. This
difficulty was realized in mid-process and there was some sentiment for slowing or stopping the
privatization process altogether until the condominium issue was settled. The Minister of
Construction vetoed both options, however. He believed the issue could be settled after
privatization was complete.
Presently, Albania still has to resolve the condominium issue. Banesi (the state housing
enterprise) continues to be responsible for managing multiple dwellings even though it has
inadequate funds to do so. As Lowry (1993, p. 13) has observed, quoting the law, “‘At the time
the tenant signs the privatization agreement, he ceases to be a tenant and no longer pays rent.’ If
this provision has in fact been noted and followed [the tenants who have privatized their
apartments] have already been relieved of their obligations to the Banesi, and the Banesi
revenues have diminished by 70 percent. Because no condominiums have been formed there22
have been no condominium assessments and no provision for alternative management. This
fiscal and managerial interregnum cannot persist without serious consequences.”
4. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE REFORM
Enough time has not passed for a verdict to be written on the impact of housing reforms in CEE
countries. Little material is yet available on the last several years of the decade of the 1990s.
However, a few preliminary comments are in order. In the first place, the CEE countries are still
going through a period of reform and transition, which should be viewed in many countries
against the background of a poor macroeconomic situation. In many countries the transition
seems to have compounded existing economic problems, whereas in the former GDR integration
has brought about the outright closure of many state-owned enterprises with accompanying
unemployment. The former GDR may be in better shape than most of the other countries,
however, because of the funding and subsidies from the federal government. CEE countries with
stronger economies such as Hungary and the Czech Republic are somewhat better off than most,
but even there the living standards have not risen for the majority of citizens and have fallen for
many, perhaps even for the mean- and median-income earner (Clapham and Kintrea 1996a,
pp. 183–84).
HOUSING MARKET: ENGINE FOR GROWTH?
Of this ongoing process the question is sometimes asked whether governments used reforms to
the housing sector as an engine to start up or accelerate other reforms or as a shock absorber to
cushion the effects of other reforms. While there has been diversity in the sequencing of the
reform process in CEE countries, as shown here, there are also similar patterns (Struyk 1996,
pp. 55–58). But in the main, it appears as though housing was not an integral part of the
economic reforms of the 1990s. Furthermore, despite the sector’s size in the economy and its
inefficiency under state socialism, the reform of the housing sector was not regarded as an
essential tool for furthering overall reform or complementing other reforms. Indeed, the sector
absorbed massive budget cuts including the deficits created in savings banks by those countries
which held fixed-rate mortgages as inflation rose. Struyk (1996) believes that privatizing
industry and overhauling macroeconomic policy were considered to be much more important
than reforming the housing sector.
Instead, housing reforms were done as a social palliative, at low cost to the new buyer. Most
countries have thus fairly explicitly used the housing sector as a shock absorber, a way to secure
one aspect of people’s lives that were changing in many ways caused by economic slowdowns,
unemployment, shrinking wages, and rising inflation.
Regardless of how it was regarded by country planners, the housing sector’s dynamics have
an important reinforcing or counter-cyclical effect on the rest of the economy. The demand for
new construction suffered several heavy blows in the transition. State subsidies for new
construction were either drastically cut or eliminated, and because of the erosive effect of
inflation on savings and wages plus overall decline in the economy, the purchasing power of the
population fell. Countering these forces was a large pent-up demand for improved housing by
high-income households. Some of them had the needed foreign exchange to shield themselves23
from the ravages of inflation (Struyk 1996, p. 29). Three countries—Armenia, Poland, and
Hungary—tried under these conditions to sustain housing construction at a fairly high level, but
all ultimately failed in the early 1990s.
CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES
Problems with slow or negative growth of industrial output have been mirrored in the
construction industry. The result is a collapse of new construction in many of the CEE countries
so that the acute housing shortages that already existed as a legacy of state socialism have not
been ameliorated—indeed, they have worsened in the transition. Where sales of state-owned
rental property to sitting tenants is accomplished at a deep discount, some believe that this
lowered prices also in the private sector which may serve as a disincentive to investment in new
housing. (Because of market segmentation, the veracity of the idea that the public rental market
affects the new private housing market very much is open to some debate.)
Albania represents one exception to the rule that construction declined in CEE during the
decade of the 1990s. The real estate market there developed significantly and the level of
construction rose from 6.6 percent of GDP in 1991 to 11.4 percent in 1996 in an otherwise
stagnant economy. In Tirana the construction market activity is highest of any city in the country.
Indeed, based on building permits, 77.6 percent of the construction investment is located in
Tirana. A land-use survey in Tirana indicates that 14 percent of the buildings were constructed
from 1991 to 1997 while 65 percent were constructed in the 45 preceding years. The high pace
of construction of the past decade is expected to continue until at least 2000 (Misja 1998, p. 63).
In the Czech and Slovak Republics, construction enterprises were all privatized. Before
privatization, they were broken into smaller units; while in the mid-1980s there were 65 such
enterprises, they were subdivided into 400 by 1991. At the same time many new private
construction firms made an appearance. Estimates of the number of smaller construction firms
registered as of mid-1991 ranged as high as 15,000, many of which were marginal operations.
There is evidence that the remnants of the old state operations retained advantages over the
newcomers, however. The older enterprises retain better access to supply networks and it appears
that government contracting still works in their favor. Competitive bidding would level the
playing field, but the practice has not yet been fully accepted (Kingsley and Mikelsons 1996,
pp. 201–02).
SOCIAL TENSIONS, UNEQUAL ACCESS
That the initial enthusiasm for democracy and the free market has not been rewarded by a better
livelihood has also brought about social tensions in some countries and caused a slowdown in
some post-socialist reforms, among them the reforms of urban housing. The housing reform that
has been most affected is that of the rental sector. According to plan, rents were to be radically
adjusted upward, at least to cover operation and maintenance charges. Early hikes in rent that
resulted in housing costs taking up a higher percentage of income, at the same time when income
was dropping and inflation was increasing, created economic problems for some renters. Political
objections were raised and these considerations were important for some retrenchment in this
policy. Objections by tenants’ associations are also instrumental in preventing rental decontrol.24
INVESTING IN NEWLY PURCHASED PROPERTY
One of the rationalizations for privatization is that when citizens have a stake in the system that
comes with ownership they are likely to maintain their dwellings in good repair. The sale of state
housing to renters has resulted in some investment in the units, but apparently only those flats
now owned by higher-income households with savings can be used for the renovation.
Furthermore, these units may be resold in a process of “trading up.”
6 It is in the economic
interest of former renters to have their apartments in good repair. The phenomenon of richer
people improving their dwellings is also evident in the rehabilitation of many villas that were
built before the socialist regime.
Because they have fewer sources for financing, however, low-income new owners tend not
to renovate. In Budapest, for example, poorer, low-income households often occupy older,
lower-quality buildings or high-rise estates that are most in need of expensive renovation. Upper-
class households are often located in newer, higher-quality buildings with lower renovation
costs. Douglas (1997, p. 205) argues, “The simple conversion of public housing to private
property [in Budapest] does in no way guarantee, or even increase the potential that renovation
will be performed: in many cases it decreases the potential.” Under present economic conditions
households cannot obtain significant financing, and legal aspects—lack of adequate
condominium law, for instance—hinder the renovation process in some countries. Douglas
continues, “Housing privatization and other housing system changes have actually exacerbated,
not alleviated the problems associated with renovation, contrary to the initial beliefs and
expectations of many.” Until problems of financing for renovation are dealt with adequately,
ownership will probably not result in most owners being able to keep their homes in good repair.
Without significant upturns in CEE economies, it is doubtful that finance problems can be
solved. This paper deals in more detail with finance in a later section (see p. 31).
Clapham and Kintrea (1996a, p. 186) also observe, “It seems inevitable that the changing
tenure structure will not obviate the need for state expenditure on housing repair in the longer
term. Privatization may encourage households to use their own resources on their housing in
contrast to the previous state-dominated system, but it seems unlikely that this will be enough by
itself to deal with stock condition problems.”
 5. DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS
Szelenyi’s ideas on distribution are based on ideas of social exchange from Polanyi; he believes
that state socialism is a social formation in which reciprocity, redistribution, and market
exchange are integrated. He maintained that the distribution of public housing increases
inequalities whereas the expansion of market opportunities under state socialism decreased them
(Szelenyi 1978). Later Szelenyi modified his views by concluding that market mechanisms were
not inherently more egalitarian than redistributive policies under state socialism (Szelenyi 1983).
Bodnar (1996) believes that it is unimportant to focus on whether markets or redistributive
policies are more egalitarian. There was inequality under state socialism (for example, renters
                                               
6 In some countries there are restrictions on reselling or there are incentives not to resell. In Slovenia, for
example, a capital gains tax of 30% must be paid if the original owner resells the property.25
received subsidies that nonrenters did not) and maldistribution is growing under the reforms in
the housing market of the 1990s. The growing inequality may be due to the combined effect of
the legacy of state socialism and the logic of the market (ibid., pp. 618–20). Clapham and
Kintrea (1996a) remind us that while there were low-income tenants, many tenants of state-
owned property that was slated for privatization were quite well off.
A review of the literature has shown that distribution problems flowing from the housing
reform process are numerous. During the first years of reform the process in CEE favored upper-
income groups—those who rented the most valuable units—even more so than the rent subsidy
under socialism. These better units promised the most lucrative return to local governments,
which were now administering public housing and implementing the privatization process. These
renters were allowed to purchase their units at highly subsidized rates, sometimes at only 15
percent of what a market assessor determined to be market price. There was great variation of
sale prices within what should have been similar quality residences. Age of buildings did not
seem to be taken as an important variable even though one-fifth of state rental properties were
constructed in the last century and one-half before the Second World War. In sum, owners of
best units were prime beneficiaries of the privatization movement and there was great
arbitrariness in the sale prices of these units.
Owners of these most valuable units tended to have advantages that others did not.
They lived in the best districts, recognized the opportunities which privatization afforded them,
reacted quickly to legal changes, and had a good starting position in terms of education and
higher incomes. Richer tenants were better represented through their tenant’s union and were
usually able to obtain more favorable prices from local governments than were poorer tenants.
Continuity prevailed as these privileges were distributed. Studies show that those favored by
the ancien régime do quite well in the new system. Intellectuals and managers were privileged in
the state socialist allocation of housing, and (in Budapest) Bodnar’s work shows that they seem
to be enjoying the bulk of today’s benefits (Bodnar 1996, p.633). In other parts of the CEE, party
members and skilled workers also received preference (Clapham and Kintrea 1996a, p. 186).
Strong, Reiner, and Szyrmer (1996, p. 241) likewise conclude, “The former Communist
managers and officials, commonly referred to as the nomenklatura, have continued to wield
considerable influence not only in the political arena but also in the economic sphere, often
behind the scenes and in transactions of questionable legality. As a result of the ‘quiet’ or
nomanklatura privatization, by which people have transferred assets to themselves, the idea of
privatization has been somewhat tainted.” Likewise of Bulgaria, Tsenkova (1996, p. 4 of Internet
version) concludes that transition to the market legitimized and reinforced the previous
inequalities in housing consumption between city and countryside and among vocational groups
with officials and technocrats at one end and blue-collar workers at the other.
In Hungary, a consequence of low-price sales of public rental property to sitting tenants is
that the higher-income groups receive a relatively large one-time subsidy, which could amount to
as much as 70 percent of the market value of the house. It is estimated that in Budapest upper-
income groups received 40 percent of the total of this windfall subsidy, while lower-income
groups have received only 17 percent (Douglas 1997, pp. 186–87, citing 1993 work by Hegedüs,
Mark, Struyk, and Tosics). Douglas (ibid., pp.72–74, 204) finds that in 1994 only 25 percent of
the housing subsidization was reaching below median-income households in Budapest. Douglas
(ibid., p. 201) also quotes Kovacs as having written with prescience at the beginning of the
transition in Hungary, “those who were critical of redistribution in an earlier phase of socialist26
housing policy in Hungary must now realize that a shift to the market principle is likely to
exaggerate inequalities, intensify segregation, and set more severe limits on mobility, both spatial
and social.”
  Results from Douglas’s own research show that “greater rewards of housing privatization
have continually gone to households of a higher social status…these households have been able
to hold on to better, more valuable, housing, in more desirable neighbourhoods, at relatively—
and perhaps absolutely—lower prices. This corresponds to the research results of others, not only
in Budapest, but throughout this post-socialist region” (Douglas 1997, p. 204).
Bodnar (1996) argues that in Budapest the privatization process, which offered many
incentives for sitting tenants to buy, caused the accentuated maldistribution appearing after 1989.
These incentives included low selling prices, the uncertain future for renting, promise of
consistent rent increases, negative real interest rates, and low down payments. (New legislation
in 1993 modified these advantages somewhat.)
Some in the CEE region who receive strong incentives to buy their rental units but who are
not in the “top echelons” of income receivers find themselves with rising maintenance costs in
addition to amortization and utility payments for which they are now responsible (previously the
government paid for them). Their inability to afford these new costs may push the low-income
group below the poverty line. Sometimes they have been known to request that the government
repurchase their properties. In a case recounted by Bodnar (1966, p. 616), a request of that nature
was rejected. As downtown areas modernize, commercial development, restitution, and luxury
housing and gentrification generally displace poorer residents in the inner cities.
Pensioners who have very low incomes were not able to make even minimal down
payments and may find themselves in the poorest rental housing without any opportunities for
bettering their housing conditions (Strong, Reiner, and Szyrmer 1996, p. 244). The housing
shortage problem may be even more acute for young couples and those new to the city (Struyk
1996, p. 28; Douglas 1997, p. 86).
Another inequity arises between those on the waiting list to receive their unit and those who
already received one. With the fall in the production of state-built residences and substantial
privatization, fewer units are available for those on waiting lists. For example, new construction
in 1993 in Hungary was only half of what it was in 1988, and in Bulgaria and Estonia it was only
30 percent (Struyk 1996, pp. 28, 30).
Bodnar (1996, p. 634) concludes: “Privatization, while placing some in the ownership of
great wealth, traps others in their very private misery and despair.” On the other hand, low-
income families have not been completely shut out of the process. Clapham and Kintrea (1996a,
p. 187) conclude, “The new reforms have meant that relatively low-income households…have
been given control over a more marketable asset.” Those who purchased their units find that
they have acquired a very marketable property. They are then able to parlay this transaction into
even greater benefits by selling their old residence at market rates and, with these proceeds,
purchase an even better, up-scale property
Modifying the present system will not be easy, but Clapham and Kintrea (1996a, p. 187)
conclude: “In the past, high income groups have received subsidy, as rents have been well below
market levels. Therefore, it can be argued that the windfall subsidy is merely continuing the
previous unequal system. Nevertheless, it is possible to conceive of an alternative system … with
poorer households protected by a targeted housing allowance. In this scenario, subsidy would be27
closely targeted on low-income households rather than on higher-income households, as at
present.” Some countries have introduced housing allowances but they are, by and large, poorly
targeted (Struyk 1996, pp. 59–60). Although many countries have discussed them, by 1993 only
the former GDR had introduced a housing allowance which protects low-income families from
large rent increases (Clapham and Kintrea 1996a, p. 175).
Another possibility (referred to earlier, see p. 11) is that instead of relying solely on a market
characterized by government encouragement of owner-occupied tenure (through mortgage
interest relief, tax write-offs for mortgage payments, etc.), another market should be created on a
second track, characterized by social or public tenure. If this second sector remains reasonably
healthy, it can handle some of the social housing issues as they arise and guide policy away from
market failures that may cause homelessness and ghettoization. Douglas (1997) feels that it is
unfortunate that the free market has been pressed on the CEE countries so enthusiastically
without careful consideration of the positive role that government might have been able to play
other than simply encouraging the private sector. Douglas (ibid., p. 204) concludes, “What can
be seen in Budapest is that this system of privatization has succeeded in creating a residualized
state rental tenure and these remaining dwellings are increasingly concentrated in either older
tenement buildings in the inner-city or large scale housing estates, mostly in peripheral areas.
How to handle the housing tensions, and concomitant social tensions, that are developing in
these increasingly run-down areas is left for the future.”
6. PRICING TRENDS FOR HOUSING
The most controversial issue in privatization is determining the price at which dwellings are to be
initially sold. A low selling price (all other things being equal) will result in a higher number of
sales, thus demonstrating a symbolic political resolve to create a market and give people a stake
in that economy. It also absolves the state and municipality from caring for that housing stock. A
large percentage of state-owned rental stock may quickly be sold off, but since prices are so low
receipts to municipalities for these sales are reduced. Also the low prices at which sitting tenants
purchase their flats provide a depressing effect on the private housing market. While rents remain
below market levels,
7 there is a smaller incentive for a private landlord to rent out his property, at
least until rent controls are lifted (Clapham and Kintrea 1996a, p. 178).
Price information on the housing market is not widely disseminated and information on
trends varies from country to country. At any rate, prices of real estate may accentuate or
ameliorate the distribution problems discussed in the previous section.
In general, tracing out price patterns of housing resold in CEE after privatization is difficult
because relevant data are often not available. In some countries registries are closed to the public.
Other countries may have a high value-based taxation policy that encourages people to
understate the housing price they put on the official record. In some countries the market is too
thin to be able to correctly assess market prices of housing. It is clear that generalizations are
difficult. Some countries show an initial price rise in housing that then declines when effective
                                               
7 For sales to rise, rents have to be increased on sitting tenants to provide an incentive to buy. Substantial rental
increases have been introduced in some countries but have been restrained by a need to control inflation and to
assuage complaints from the general public about falling living standards.28
demand is filled. In other countries, prices remain high for a longer period for one reason or
another.
Struyk (1996, pp. 33–34) notes that “what one can safely say is that nearly all countries
experienced a spurt in the real price of new units when prices were liberalized, as households
with money to spend sought to quickly purchase the small number of available units. After a year
or two, as more units came on the market, especially thanks to privatization, the real price of new
and existing dwellings softened, sometimes significantly.” For now, Struyk observes, prices have
stabilized at a level that is still high by Western standards. Overall housing prices have exceeded
inflation so that investment in housing is better than putting money into a savings account.
Douglas’s (1997) work agrees with that of Struyk (1996) and shows that for Hungary earlier
surges in the real estate market were countered with declines in price after those with effective
demand were satisfied. He shows that the real price per square meter of apartment housing in
Budapest declined in real terms between 1990 and 1994 while private turnover of flats rose from
1990 to 1992 (this calculation excludes single-family homes) and then declined from 1992 to
1994. The decline after 1992 is due to the decreasing effective demand of the population; the
latent demand for housing is still high. Apartments in desirable areas seem to have maintained
their price better than flats in poorer areas. It appears that housing prices have fallen relative to
income in a number of CEE countries as the decade wears on (Douglas 1997, pp. 87–88). This
has occurred not because the housing shortage has disappeared—people still want and need
housing—but increasingly they cannot afford housing due to inflation and declining real wages.
Strong, Reiner, and Szyrmer (1996, pp. 245–46) observe that in their anecdotal research
prices for housing are from 3 to 5 times higher in major cities compared to medium-sized ones.
In Sofia and Warsaw, median sales prices in 1993 were $44 per square foot and $50 per square
foot, respectively. In some areas of the cities, the city center and luxury suburbs, for example,
real housing prices will probably continue to increase; higher prices are paid for central locations
and higher-quality space. The losers in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland are those
attempting to sell apartments in the concrete, prefabricated structures (estates) of the Communist
era. Douglas (1997, pp. 89–90) concludes, “From March 1990 to March 1995…the nominal
price increase has been forty per cent for Budapest housing estates and nearly 45 per cent for all
flats. This also means that real prices have fallen more drastically in housing estates than in the
market as a whole. This will not come as a surprise, as many housing estates in East European
cities are, according to some, destined to be the ‘new ghettos’ for the ‘post-socialist underclass.’
Even in housing estates there is great price variation….”
The price for single-family dwellings (not included in the above discussion) increased in
Budapest between 1990 and 1994: on average, nominal prices trebled while real prices increased
by about 17 percent. Therefore, on average, single-family homes are holding their own against
inflation and can be considered secure investments. Again, however, housing in the best districts
made superior investments and if two of these “best housing “ districts were omitted from the
calculation the real price actually shows a 22 percent decline from 1990 to 1994. In these two
districts, real estate prices rose 52 percent and 68 per cent. It is unlikely, of course, that these
price growth figures will be sustained (Douglas 1977, p. 90).
The prices for housing units, one-family houses, and building plots have increased in
Slovakia, particularly in Bratislava where average prices increased threefold in the first three
years of reform. Here, demand has not fallen because of growing differentiation in incomes, the29
increase in the number of people who want to invest in real estate, and the return of some
wealthy émigrés.
Prices for privatized flats, apartments in cooperative housing, and flats in restituted
buildings have been high in Estonia. A house in fair condition in the medium-low range cost the
equivalent of 20 years of income for an average earner. Financing for such a unit simply was not
available; but even if a loan at 5 percent could be obtained, almost the entire household income
would have to be used just to pay the interest (Turner and Victorin 1996, pp. 349–50).
Currently the market for private rentals in Budapest is small, perhaps 2 percent of the
housing stock. This stock is either lower-quality (though still expensive) units or high-quality
expensive units usually rented to expatriates. The indigenous new rich prefer to buy rather than
rent. Rents for private housing are probably 10 to 50 times higher than those for public-owned
housing. In 1994 it was shown that the median rent of a public housing unit was 2.7 percent of
median household income while the comparable figure in the private market was 36.2 percent.
Those who must use the private market, such as young couples and new entrants to the city,
spend a large percentage of their income for fairly low-quality accommodations.
In Albania, there is a staggering amount of building activity in Tirana and Durres, and
housing and rental prices are reported to be double those in other parts of the country,
comparable with prices in capital cities elsewhere in the region (Stanfield, Childress, and
Dervishi 1998, p. 15). Still, residential housing is scarce. In Tirana over the last 3 years, 50,000
dwelling units have been built—to house a population that has doubled in less than a decade—
from 250,000 in 1991 to over 500,000 today (Moores and Flynn 1997, p. 2). Building activity in
the rest of Albania is reported to be low (Stanfield, Childress, and Dervishi 1998, p. 15).
HOUSING PRICES AND ISSUES IN BULGARIA
As early as 1985, 84 percent of the housing stock in Bulgaria was privately owned and owner
occupied as the state, unlike most other CEE countries, encouraged home ownership with
subsidies and nationally controlled prices. Still the housing market was very controlled in that
housing could not be sold or exchanged without the approval of the municipality; there was no
resale market and the possibility of profiting from housing as an investment was eliminated. In a
sense Bulgaria was favorably placed when the new free market rules were set in place in 1990.
But economic conditions were so unfavorable that the shortage of affordable housing became a
serious problem. At the same time, both rents and sale prices for housing increased. The
affordability gap was so great at the beginning of the decade that only about 10 percent of
households could purchase homes.
There are housing shortages of some 320,000 units in Bulgaria.  Thirty percent of urban
households were still on municipal waiting lists from the ex-socialist housing system at the
beginning of the decade. Meanwhile, the public rental sector contracted from 16 percent to 8
percent of all housing units between 1989 and 1992 as units were sold to former tenants on
favorable terms.
New housing output in Bulgaria reached its lowest level in 50 years in the early 1990s.
Housing market activity then mainly consisted of transactions of high-income households
involving purchase of a second house (when the restriction that a Bulgarian household could
only own one house was removed as part of the reforms) and dwellings under construction. This30
market is forged of a high-income group attempting to escape from inflationary pressure by
investing in real property. Previous uniformity in price, characteristic of state socialism, is being
gradually transformed into a system reflecting various factors—location, quality and size of
dwelling, accessibility, technical infrastructure, and amenities in the community. In spatial terms
submarkets are beginning to develop in various areas of cities. As a consequence, particular
residential areas of Sofia are developing into high-status areas occupied by the privileged, while
others will ultimately turn into areas of low-income housing (Tsenkova 1996, p. 4 of Internet
version). In the past neighborhoods in Sofia had been more heterogeneous.
The price of housing in Bulgaria rose by 6 to 10 times on average in 1990 because of
speculation. Equally dramatic was the rise in the price of land. Liberalized prices of building
materials, fuel, and labor in February 1991 increased house prices by another 50 percent. In some
urban markets 1993 housing prices are 60 to 90 times higher than 1989 levels (Tsenkova 1996,
p. 4 of Internet version). It is rather clear that Tsenkova refers to nominal and not real prices in
her study.
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) reports that the housing
sector has contributed to the slowdown of the recovery of the Bulgarian economy during the
transition. Investments in housing as a share of total investment is considerably lower than in
other reforming CEE countries. The main cause for the deficiency in investment in housing is the
low level of profitability, together with high construction costs. Also to blame is the lack of
mortgage credit (and credits for repair and renovation) that is especially exacerbated during
inflationary times, and the government’s indifference to the plight of the housing market
(UNECE 1996, pp. x–xi, 1–2, 10–15). New housing construction and floor space per person
declined markedly in the transition (ibid., pp. 6–7).
While most indicators on the affordability of housing in Bulgaria have worsened
significantly during the transition, average household expenditure on housing still does not
exceed 10–15 percent of household expenses, far less than in most countries of Western Europe
(ibid., pp. 10–15). The policy of low rental rates for public-sector housing reduces resources
needed for maintenance and repair of this housing stock.
A national housing allowance system targeted at the poor, is urgently needed, concludes the
UNECE (1996, p. xi). Presently, the government seems indifferent to the homeless problem that
exists in Bulgaria. The need for low-income housing has increased markedly during the
transition period: at the time of the UNECE report, 88 percent of the population registered
incomes below the calculated Minimum Social Standard and about two-thirds of the population
had a registered income below the Minimum Living Standard. These dramatic figures coincide
with the collapse in the construction of new public-sector residences during the transition (ibid.,
pp. 10–15).
HIGH-PRICE VERSUS LOW-PRICE STRATEGY
The former GDR allowed some pilot projects to include the renovation of properties with federal
government money before putting them on sale. Renovated properties were then sold at a higher
price than the unimproved stock that could be purchased at low prices as in the rest of the CEE.
The result is that sales have been slower. The high price does not necessarily mean that the
income to the state will be greater than under the low-price option because the number of sales31
will probably be much lower with many households not being able to purchase. Nevertheless, it
could be argued that high price conserves rented housing. Some say that it makes more effective
use of the housing stock. But adhering to a policy that directs housing to the affluent has
important consequences for distribution. Nonetheless, some feel that the incentive to buy is
stronger the greater the value of the house. Under the high-price option, owners will be able to
retain less money to carry out further renovation and meet continuing repair commitments, but
then repair costs are likely to be lower.
The former GDR is the only country to have adopted a high-price sales strategy. It was able
to follow this strategy because of financing by the federal German government, which has
allowed the maintenance budget of existing stock to increase. The sale of this repaired or even
rehabilitated stock has been undertaken on a planned and long-term basis without the short-term
rush in sales brought about by low prices. Sales amounted to 20,000 units in 1992 out of a stock
of 2.8 million; there has been a fivefold increase in rents since unification (Clapham and Kintrea
1996a, pp. 178–79).
7. FINANCING URBAN HOUSING
8
Housing during state socialism was financed by the government and by state industries;
individuals contributed to the process with forced savings and sweat equity. As an example of
the latter, labor was often provided by the family itself. Hegedüs and Tosics (1996, p. 22) quote
Kansky, who summarized the situation in Russia as the CEE model: “The average private family
house was constructed by using the family’s savings, ingenuity, labour and ‘do- it-yourself’
skills, and most leisure time, after purchasing, legally or illegally, the necessary construction
materials. The general lack of housing materials on the market has contributed to purchases from
the ‘black market’ and from government warehouses by the spending of Western currency
obtained usually from relatives or friends living in the Western world.” He continues by
observing that the family itself performed the largest amount of work. According to a recent
survey, the family built about 30 percent of the least-expensive family houses with little help
from professional builders. The services performed by professional builders were too high priced
for an average-income family. Some aspects of sweat equity have been carried over into the
reforms of the 1990s.
FINANCING IN THE FSU AND THE CEE COMPARED
Although there were common features, the CEE and the FSU countries entered the reform period
with some differences in long-term lending patterns for housing. Among the shared features
were a monopoly of housing finance by each country’s state savings banks and the use of fixed-
interest loans. With fixed prices and little or no inflation, fixed rates in the realm of 2 or 3 percent
were feasible. Loan periods were usually long—at least 25 years. Defaults were exceptional
because banks could easily garnish wages in cases of nonpayment. On the other hand, in the rare
case of default, constitutional provisions made eviction nearly impossible unless the lender could
provide the borrower with comparable alternative housing. Because of this foreclosure problem,
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housing loans could not take the property as collateral. The loans were simple signature loans
and not mortgage contracts. After the reforms of the 1990s, most of CEE still could not use
property to secure loans.
The differences between the FSU and the CEE were in the volume of lending undertaken
and the depth of subsidies associated with home construction. In the situation in which housing
strategies attempted to gain maximum flexibility in the use of household resources, loan volumes
were high. In other countries where the state desired to maintain the primacy of renting, central
planners tightly controlled loans and loan volumes were low. The countries of the FSU and the
former Czechoslovakia, according to Struyk (1996, pp. 34–35), fell into the second group.
Examples of countries in the first group are Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Slovenia. In these
latter countries, various forms of down payments and interest rate subsidies accompanied high-
volume, long-term housing lending. Albania seems to belong to a third category in which the
state all but abandons the housing sector.
TASKS OF A HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM AND PROBLEMS OF THE 1990S
There are three primary tasks of a housing finance system. One is financing the construction of
new housing, which usually requires financing for a year or two. The second is providing long-
term loans enabling individuals to purchase that property. The third is providing medium-term
credit for rehabilitation purposes. To date, no county in the CEE except the former GDR (which
can draw on the resources of the federal government) has been able to provide more than a
smattering of funds for housing.
A major concern is that state financing available under socialism has ended and the private
sector has not yet been able to take its place. Since loans for home purchase have been
problematic, the sale of state rental housing (usually at a low price, with subsidized interest rates,
and easy installments) is paid for from personal family savings. In some CEE countries given the
forced savings from the years under state socialism (or accumulation of foreign currency),
purchases of apartments from the state sector were simply paid immediately, “cash on the
barrelhead.”
As forced savings disappeared or were eroded by inflation, financing became a major
bottleneck for private owners and renters in CEE. Other factors were in play that caused a need
for more borrowing than before: building materials rose in price; wages and salaries for the
majority declined; prices for private dwellings rose; housing in the central cities became more
costly as it was increasingly competing with new businesses; rents increased; housing subsidies
began to disappear; and industry and the government got out of the housing business as repair,
renovation, and maintenance became the responsibility of individuals.
During economic transition, prices that were formerly controlled were freed to some extent
and a sharp surge of inflation ensued in all CEE countries. In response, the state savings banks
raised their interest rates for borrowers and savers. The combination of falling purchasing power
caused by inflation and dropping real wages and higher interest rates cut the demand for long-
term housing loans. Furthermore, some state banks were not willing to extend new loans even at
the higher interest rate. Loan volumes dropped precipitously from 1991 to 1994.
9
                                               
9 Struyk (1996, p. 36) includes a graph showing this trend for Hungary, Bulgaria, and Slovenia.33
PROBLEMS WITH OLD LOANS
During the transition, state banks also grappled with loans acquired under state socialism. To
cope with these old loans, banks usually raised the interest rate to borrowers or made a deal to
prepay old loans at some discount. Slovenia was an exception and attempted to retain low
interest rates, realizing enormous losses on its outstanding portfolio as a result. Hungary
protected its old loans better than most. The government gave borrowers the choice of paying a
higher but still below-market interest (which would in the future be adjustable to market
conditions at the discretion of the bank) or repaying the entire loan with a 50 percent discount on
the outstanding principal. About three-quarters of outstanding loan balances were paid off in this
way.
NEW HOUSING LOANS
Many bankers became wary of extending new housing loans after their money-losing experience
with old loans. As a result countries like Poland, Slovenia, and the Czech and Slovak Republics
began to innovate in financing policy. For example, Poland adopted a dual index mortgage in
1992. Borrowers’ first payment is calculated at the level of the current inflation rate and then
each additional monthly payment is adjusted according to the index of wages. Also foreclosure
and eviction were reinstated in Poland. Meanwhile, Bulgaria and Estonia have not reformed the
banking system and Hungary has retained its state savings-bank monopoly and made modest
changes in policy.
The World Bank concluded that in Poland while housing was not a political priority during
the early 1990s, in 1993–1994 the government realized that lack of housing was a major brake
on economic development. To indicate its importance, in 1997 the housing sector was put under
the prime minister’s direction. Even so, financing was still a scarce and critical ingredient. In
particular, improved financial instruments were needed to accomplish three tasks: (a) investment
in maintenance and repair of the existing housing stock; (b) financing of new municipal rental
housing; and (c) a more efficiently targeted housing allowance system. The most pressing target,
a World Bank study concluded, was the first. Investment in the existing stock would be least
expensive on a per capita basis and it could also contribute to energy conservation and
environmental improvements (UNECE 1998a, p. x ).
Financing for the development of the housing market is seen as critical in Slovenia, but few
changes have been instituted. Before reforms state sources were responsible for one-half of all
housing investment. It is clear that money will no longer be raised from the net income of the
state-run enterprises; it will be raised by local taxation on personal income and private property.
The new system of municipal taxation is not yet in full operation (Mandic 1996, p. 166). In
Slovenia a simple variable interest rate is still used,
10 but very few loans have been given out,
and the mortgage contract is not used (Struyk 1996, p. 39). The private sector has not responded
by providing low-cost capital in a way that would displace the former public sector. There are no
home-savings banks, building societies, or cooperative banks in Slovenia (Mandic 1996,
pp. 164–65).
                                               
10 In 1994 the annual interest rate was the inflation rate plus 12%.34
After the commencement of public rental housing sales in Slovenia in October 1991, there
was a housing rush in which one-third of the social housing units were sold by the end of March
1992. If buyers could pay immediately in a lump sum, they would receive a 60 percent discount
in the asking price. Most buyers preferred this option. It also would have been possible to
arrange a 20-year payment period with low interest rates, but purchasers did not have enough
faith in the government to buy under this option. They were afraid that the government might
raise the rate sometime in mid-course, making the terms more stringent. In order to encourage
sales, tenants were allowed to use their foreign-currency savings deposits in commercial banks
that would be converted to local currency at the official rate. Local foreign-exchange accounts
were frozen at the time save for this exception. Most buyers did not use this option either: they
apparently had hidden savings of foreign currency—at home and in Austrian banks. These
savings were rewarded at the time of exchange by financial institutions with a premium of some
10 to 15 percent over the official rate.
Under the system of state socialism in Czechoslovakia public resources were allocated to
finance house construction through the Complex Housing Construction System. The system has
carried over into the reform period, but today finance from this entity is available only for work
on unfinished buildings. New legislation identifies support for housing construction as a crucial
task for national, regional, and community authorities. It also requires that housing opportunities
be provided to low-income households, but in the main it aims to strengthen personal
responsibility to solve housing needs. State support is provided through grants and by indirect
means such as tax rebates and preferred loans. The legislation is also designed to support the
construction and modernization of related infrastructure. A specialized finance institute is
contemplated to support the construction and modernization of housing. But the development of
all of this has been curtailed or delayed because of limitations on the state budget.
The enabling legislation for a home savings scheme came into effect in 1992 with the
opening of the first Slovakia home savings bank. This bank provides some contributions and
institutional savers are given preference to receive building loans (Michalovic 1996, pp. 146–47).
In the Czech and Slovak Republics, a contract savings scheme was introduced in 1993 with
lending rate at 6 percent and savings rate at 3 percent. The scheme is highly subsidized. The
contract lending of these sister republics is essentially a closed system where savers borrow back
from themselves. In a closed system it is possible for loans to carry a low interest rate, which is
financed by a low rate on savings. The savings balance will be eroded if there is much inflation,
so this kind of system is possible only when there is a fairly high level of price stability. The
system had about 485,000 open accounts in the Czech Republic and about 200,000 in the Slovak
Republic by the end of 1994, but neither had begun their lending program (Struyk 1996, pp. 37–
41).
In Hungary, the State Savings Bank still maintains a near monopoly on lending. The
adjustable rate mortgage was introduced in 1994 but has met with limited acceptance. Borrowing
remains subsidized and foreclosure procedures have been somewhat streamlined. The Deferred
Payment Mortgage offered by the State Savings Bank is designed to maintain affordability in an
inflationary environment. This instrument (supported by USAID) allows repayment at a much
lower than market rate, increasing the affordability of the loan but decreasing sustainability of
the program after international aid stops.
  In Bulgaria, inflation and monetary reforms have affected the housing finance markets
unfavorably. The State Savings Bank is the only source of short-term construction loans to35
public and private developers and long-term construction loans to housing cooperatives and
homeowners. Apart from high interest rates, the State Savings Bank offers a substantially lower
construction credit or mortgage amount than is needed to cover the actual cost of housing, further
discouraging borrowers.
  In general, privatization in CEE had two important effects on long-term housing credit:
1.  In countries that charged a nontrivial price for state-owned housing, local governments sold
them to individual buyers usually with a highly subsidized interest rate. Since the local
government owned the unit, it did not have to advance money to the tenant. The tenant could
buy now and pay in installments. This lessened the pressures for long-term loans.
2.  The local government endowed those privatized units with substantial instant equity. The
new owners could immediately turn around and use this equity to purchase upgraded units.
In Albania, for example, there is a demand for up-scale properties in major cities like Tirana
and Durres. Buyers are generally urban residents seeking larger living quarters for their extended
families. Sellers, on the other hand, tend to be owners of older apartments requiring investment,
persons willing to sell their restituted real property, or emigrants who have left behind their
property. Lack of financing is a major constraint in this property market. Perhaps the greatest
constraint is the absence of a mortgage market. All banks suspended residential mortgages in
1996 due to high default rates. High rates of default have been complicated by difficulties
enforcing foreclosure and eviction against mortgage defaulters. In addition, interest rates are
high. The vouchers that were given for enterprise privatization,
11 which are now selling as low as
10 percent of face value, have proved the most straightforward manner of paying for residential
real estate (Moores and Flynn 1997, pp. 2–3).
Another gap that exists in CEE is the one in lending for construction. In the pre-reform
period, financing came from three sources: the state savings bank, the country’s budget, and
personal savings. In the 1990s, government funding for construction disappeared except for the
military and a few other special groups. Equity financing is now the major source of funding for
construction. Seldom does one investor have all the needed funds for a project. This has spawned
a variety of schemes from simply paying in advance to more elaborate arrangements. Sometimes
investors build a home that they could occupy if need be, selling their interest to an investor or
homebuyer when the unit is complete.
Even though programs for increasing the financial flows to the CEE urban real-estate sector
have been largely stymied in the 1990s, the institutions that will facilitate financing in the future
are beginning to appear. In addition to private banks, real estate agents—a profession that did not
exist under state socialism—have begun to emerge to facilitate housing transactions. Real estate
advertisements have begun to appear in the Hungarian press, for example. In Bratislava (Slovak
Republic), 37 real estate firms were operating at the end of 1992. As of the mid-1990s there were
400 realtors in Sofia and 1,500 throughout Bulgaria. The 25 larger ones have computer listings
and share some information on sellers but not on buyers or purchase prices. One weekly
newspaper is devoted solely to Sofia-area real estate for purchase or rent. While there is much
available information on asking price, details of actual purchase price and rental prices are very
limited (Strong, Reiner, and Szyrmer 1996, pp. 68–69).
                                               
11 In Albania, as in other CEE countries, individuals received vouchers when state enterprises were privatized.36
In Albania, it is somewhat surprising that there is so much market activity in real estate
given the low levels of security and financing and lack of real estate agencies. A recent study
found ten agencies in Tirana dealing full-time with real estate, employing a combined total of
twenty to twenty-five people. Only two or three of these have “consolidated their position in the
market.” The others do not represent significant investments, lacking office space, automobiles,
and even telephones. Only the top five are specialized; the rest combine real estate with import-
export trade, tourism, and other services. There are only three or four agencies outside the
capital. The study observes, “Cities of comparable size to Tirana in other Central and Eastern
European cities average twenty to thirty agencies each employing fifteen to twenty agents”
(Moores and Flynn 1997, pp. 4–5).
TAX INCENTIVES
While many of the subsidies and allowances that enabled families to purchase homes or flats
have disappeared or are in the process of drying up, some CEE countries have begun to include
incentives for adding to the housing stock in their tax systems. In Poland, for example, the
personal income tax, introduced in 1992, includes a deduction for investment in housing.
Specifically, the provision allows deductions for: (1) purchase or acquisition of a building lot, (2)
purchase of a new dwelling, (3) construction or extension of a private flat or house, (4)
construction of private tenement buildings, and (5) repairs and improvements to a dwelling.
Ceilings on deductions are set annually according to the level of construction prices and tax rates.
In 1993 the amount of lost taxes due to these deductions was estimated at 5 to 6 percent of the
total tax revenue from the personal income tax.
DOES OWNERSHIP FOSTER INVESTMENT?
A major finding of the Douglas (1997) study is that because of a lack of financing, private
ownership in Hungary did not lead to more investment in dwellings for purposes of renovation.
In the former GDR, in contrast, where funds were made available from the federal government,
renovation of the rental housing stock prior to selling is taking place and improvements are also
being made by the tenants-cum-owners. No other country in the CEE has had the financing
advantage enjoyed by the former GDR, however. The former GDR was also helped by its
incorporation of West German law that included an extensive body of condominium law missing
in much of the CEE (Kohli and Kintrea 1996, pp. 41–55).
8. PHYSICAL CITY SPACES
City centers in the CEE region that had not been destroyed in World War II ceased to develop
under state socialism. There was almost no incentive to build new headquarters, hotels, banks,
department stores, and the like. Lack of investment contributed to the stability of the physical
settlement patterns and meant that at the end of the 1980s the center of Prague, for example,
looked much the same as it did a half-century before. At the edge of cities in most of the CEE
countries, however, from the 1960s on the construction of housing estates changed the way the
periphery of cities looked.37
Musil (1993) maintains that the redistributive aspects of state socialism, the absence of a
land market, and the decommodification of the housing market had the following effects on city
settlement patterns:
¤  In the city centers, there were fewer functional and physical changes than in cities of similar
size in non-socialist countries.
¤  Housing estates were substantially larger than apartment complexes in capitalist countries.
¤  Fewer people proportionally lived in capital cities in socialist countries than in capitalist
ones; on the other hand, there were more people proportionally living in medium-sized cities
in socialist counties.
¤  Larger cities seem to have less effect as “growth poles” on the medium-sized cities around
them in socialist countries when compared to capitalist economies.
Musil (1993) also contends, however, that there were some similarities between capitalist
and socialist cities. In both, a certain amount of social segregation took place, although the role
of socioeconomic status was less pronounced under state socialism than it was in countries with
market economies. Elderly people and low-income families were more concentrated (or trapped)
in deteriorating city centers in countries under state socialism than in capitalist countries.
In general, the central city in CEE under state socialism suffered from a lack of
infrastructure and housing maintenance. In Budapest, for example, this contributed to the out-
migration of higher-income families from the inner city to suburbs. In 1990, one-fifth of the
residences in Budapest were only one room and 12 percent did not have toilets inside the
dwelling. Usually there was a communal toilet on each floor. These figures rise to 45 percent and
30 percent, respectively, in the inner city. In some inner city areas, 40 to 50 percent of dwellings
suffered from major deferred maintenance. It has been shown that if Western standards applied,
an estimated 30,000 dwelling units in the inner city would have been condemned while around
110,000 units in Budapest are in urgent need of repair. Meanwhile, there were high population
densities in the inner city area, many parks in the inner city were destroyed, transportation was
less accessible, and crime rates were higher at the beginning of the 1990s (Douglas 1977, pp. 65–
67).
Revitalizing inner cities has been on going for a decade or more and now inner cities—
especially in Budapest and Prague—are attractive locations for new business. This change
implies a gradual conversion from residential to office buildings. Luxury shops for tourists and
banks are replacing old retailers and other firms or residences. Some new shops have
international connections. The prestige of high-rise apartments for residential purposes is
declining, though some apartment upgrading in the downtown area is also occurring. Pichler-
Milanovich (1994) observes that before 1989 property in inner CEE cities was mostly owned by
the state. Despite a building boom in downtown areas there is still a scarcity of offices in
Budapest and Prague. Shortage has led to property prices comparable to West European capital
cities. Many new firms are buying recently privatized flats and turning them into commercial
space even though law prohibits this action.
In CEE more generally, population density of inner cities has been declining since the mid-
1960s. The population loss was accentuated in the 1980s. Despite population loss, the residential
populations of inner cities has been substantial until recently. But private developers operating in
the inner city are now concentrating on the housing needs of higher-income people. So38
revitalization tends to lead to gentrification and the process is displacing poor people who have
no place to go, a trend expected to continue. A social policy that will ameliorate this situation is
needed. As CEE capital cities begin to compete with the capital cities in West Europe, the
polarization problem will probably be accentuated.
  Pichler-Milanovich (1994, p. 8 of Internet version) projects these influences into the future:
“There will be less equity in living conditions, common interests will disintegrate, and social
variation and conflicting interest will grow. Occupational pattern will change. New social groups
will emerge. The changes that can be expected in central and east European capital cities could
be much more profound than those observed in western European cities in the 1970s and 1980s.
Social polarization could have inevitable consequences for the geographical pattern and
development of the cities and urban regions.”
With the development of the market economy after 1990, urban areas in CEE countries are
displaying some of the following changes:
1.  Urban centers have begun to revive and respond to increases in tourism. There is also a trend
to locate shops with specialty or luxury goods in the downtown areas. Foreign owners
usually want to establish their businesses in the city center. There is also a boom in hotel
building. All of these do not bode well for the poor and elderly who often had apartments in
the central city and now have to move out because of rapidly rising rents and gentrification.
2.  Outside of the central city, suburban housing areas have begun to develop. More
heterogeneity between neighborhoods is appearing in the new housing stock to reflect
sharper differences in socioeconomic status.
3.  New patterns of social segregation are developing and it is likely that different areas of the
city will become more socially homogeneous neighborhoods.
In the future there will probably be a larger concentration of people in central cities and a
higher rate of migration from both the countryside and the medium-sized towns to central cities
with the development of the market economy. The reasons for this central city boom include the
growing number of jobs in service sectors located in large cities, the importance of the
communications industry (in which there are substantial economies of scale), and growing
international businesses that gravitate to large cities.
Because of this growth in primary city size, in CEE there is renewed interest in regional
planning. In Poland, for example, the new market economy requires corresponding changes in
the planning framework. New principles, consistent with the market framework, need to be
adopted for the management of spatial development. Continuous adaptation will require a precise
definition of public responsibilities and interests, and regulations to protect those interests.
Concomitantly, in view of the diversity of private-sector interests, an effort should be made to
provide a favorable environment for the mobilization of private capital, investment, and labor.
Planning will also be expected to mediate in cases of conflicts on the spatial developments of the
urban economy and to facilitate the efficient operation of land and property markets (UNECE
1998b, pp. 30 and 61–69).39
9. URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE
In the CEE countries, lack of sewer systems is relatively common, and not only in rural areas. In
1994, in 12 CEE countries only 65 percent of dwellings had piped sewers while 83 percent had
piped water. Serious pollution occurs when dwellings have piped water but no adequate
sewerage system. There are exceptions, however. In Romania, for example, in four of the
country’s largest cities about 92 percent of the inhabitants have access to both piped water and a
satisfactory sewer system. In CEE generally, repair of many sewer and water systems was
postponed during the collapse of state socialism and the transition; they now need attention.
Roads have also been widely neglected in the CEE region and this is an especially severe
problem given the opening to the West, which has brought a serious problem of automobile
congestion to urban areas. Rail transport has traditionally been the dominant form of
transportation in the CEE, carrying, in 1990, two-thirds of goods compared to one-fifth in the
EU. In Romania road transport rose 50 percent between 1990 and 1993. The number of cars in
Warsaw rose from 210 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1990 to 312 in 1992. Numbers of automobiles in
CEE since that time have continued to rise at an impressive rate, while urban highways have not
kept pace because of a systematic lack of investment in them. The Economic Commission for
Europe concludes: “The quality of the roads [in 1990] was generally poor in all countries of the
region; very few roads had been built to motorway standards. For the most part, rail and road
corridors run parallel and link together the major centers in eastern and central Europe but, at
least in 1993 they were in great need of modernization and extension. Modernization has begun
and in some countries such as Hungary and Romania, is well under way. The estimated needs are
enormous, however, and total costs have been projected to be very high” (UNECE 1998b, p. 22).
The infrastructure of telecommunications is also poorly developed. Much has been achieved
for businesses and public authorities if not for private individual households. The gap between
Hungary and the western industrialized countries, for example, should be closed by 2000,
estimates the UNECE, and regional disparities in telephone connections reduced. In Romania,
telecommunications are also receiving priority treatment (UNECE 1998b, p. 23).
In a study of Tirana, Albania (Driscoll, Ersenkal, and Iadarola 1994, p. 12), water, sewers,
and roads were mentioned as priority areas for infrastructure improvement. Presently, the
existing sewage system is inadequate and there are no treatment facilities. As the city grows the
ability of the existing system to accommodate increased flows is increasingly called into question
to say nothing about the peripheral development that is not served by the existing city system at
all. In terms of roads, the Driscoll, Ersenkal, and Iadarola study (ibid., p. 13) recommends the
widening of the main route between Tirana and Durres (the nearest port city), which has begun,
and a new road to create a more direct link between Tirana and Rinas airport.
10. THE CITY’S PERIPHERY
Little is known about peripheral settlement in the CEE countries; they have not been studied in
much detail. Likewise, students have neglected the peripheral economy that is gradually
becoming legitimated. Development of housing on the periphery has occurred during socialist
and post-socialist periods. Beginning in the early 1990s, significant rural-urban migration, a
shortage of urban housing units, and an inadequate urban planning policy have resulted in40
significant land invasions on urban peripheries. Whether squatter settlements are accompanying
the housing reforms of the 1990s is a matter for further study in the various CEE countries.
SOCIALIST HOUSING ON THE PERIPHERY
As vacant land was used up within the cities of Hungary (and other CEE countries) during the
socialist period, the location of rental units moved out to the city’s periphery. In the 1970s and
1980s, an outer ring of new housing estates was built where most new rental flats were located.
The majority of this housing was in prefabricated high-rise buildings, consisting of two-room
flats with minimum comfort levels and shoddy construction (Hegedüs, Mark, and Tosics 1996,
p. 112).
In Belgrade, slum settlements also developed on the city’s periphery. During the period of
state socialism land had no price and so developers were expected to pay a combination of three
fees to government: an urban land-donation fee, an urban land-servicing fee, and an urban land-
use fee. The first two were paid in advance of building, and the last was paid in regular
installments. These fees were paid according to the blueprint or based on actual floor space. The
fees could be increased unilaterally by the municipal authorities. Such increases were usually
forthcoming when fiscal revenues for those municipalities fell short. This proved to be a very
inefficient way to allocate land. Also, investment in land was precluded by the monopoly in
public ownership. The combination of the lack of market prices for land and the pattern of urban
land fees led Belgrade into urban sprawl and neglect of urban redevelopment. Negligible land
fees combined with cheap rentals resulted in relatively low housing costs, which attracted people
from rural areas and smaller towns. Begovic (1993, pp. 147–51) believes that the growth of
Belgrade was more like cities in the Third World than those in Europe.
Whether squatter settlements are accompanying the housing reforms of the 1990s is a matter
for further study in the various the CEE countries.
POST-SOCIALIST HOUSING ON THE PERIPHERY: ALBANIA EXAMPLE
In Tirana, Albania, peripheral settlement is taking place very rapidly. There is a great demand for
housing in Tirana as rural-to-urban migration continues apace and the birth rate remains
relatively high. The city is growing at an estimated rate of 7 percent per annum and Tirana’s
population is expected to grow from 500,000 at the beginning of the 1990s to 1 million by 2000
or before.
12 Many in-migrants do not have the savings to pay for housing within the city limits,
and financing for housing is very limited.
Sixty percent of the demand for new housing comes from low-income groups (Misja 1998,
p. 57; Bongwa 1998, pp. 33–34). Poverty in Albania is widespread with 26 percent of the
population of Tirana subsisting on a dollar a day or less. This figure grows to 35 percent in the
periphery. The option is to self-build outside the city limits on land that is unoccupied, raising the
probability of conflict with present legal owners (if they can prove themselves as such). Indeed,
                                               
12 Slootweg (1998, p. 137) estimates that the 1998 population of Tirana is about 700,000.41
25 percent of the population of greater Tirana lives outside the city proper, according to Misja
(1998, p. 56) and the Housing Department.
Some who elected to build on the periphery also despaired of the housing situation within
the city proper, in which much of the existing housing is substandard and crowded. In the other
East European countries floor space per inhabitant ranged from 15 square meters in Romania to
26 in Hungary, with a CEE average of about 20 square meters.
13 The floor space in Tirana is 8
square meters per inhabitant (Misja 1998, p. 56).
Some marginal settlement is due to the inflexibility of the master plan for Tirana which was
designed in 1989, before the fall of state socialism in the country (Misja 1998 p. 62; Dhamo
1998, p. 26; Bongwa 1998, p. 46). Honored more in the breach than in practice, there is a
procedure in Tirana and some other cities of Albania that outlines the legal steps that builders
and planners embarking on new construction must take (Dhamo 1998, p. 22–25). Since this
model is state-centered and top-down, scholars and policymakers have recently been calling for a
new procedure that permits more robust local control of the process (ibid.).
14 Furthermore, as
Bongwa (1998, p. 34) claims, “Without an adequate supply of planned land with access to
infrastructure and basic municipal services new households and employment formation [sic] are
forced to seek new land in informal settlements primarily in locations of strategic future
economic development, which is exposing even larger parts of the population to health and
environmental risks.” In order to solve this problem, Bongwa (1998) advocates that private-
public partnerships (uncommon in the past) and other innovative combinations of policies and
programs should be organized to supply infrastructure to the urbanizing area at relatively low
cost. Moreover, Bongwa (ibid., p. 47) claims, “Public Private Partnerships in service provision
may open new avenues … (incorporating) low income groups, if appropriate service components
are offered and if adequate mechanisms of cross-subsidy are built in.”
While some parts of Tirana proper lack basic infrastructure,
15 low-density areas on the
outskirts are almost completely devoid of it and occupy twice the area of the land within the city
limits. Peripheral settlements pose some grave consequences for agricultural land (which is
scarce in Albania but of fairly good quality around Tirana) and sensitive ecological areas.
                                               
13 In Norway, each person has 49 square meters of living space (UNECE 1998b, p. 18).
14 However, this is easier said than done. Aliaj (1998, p. 100) note that “The local governments of Albania are
financially (almost) totally supported by the state and do not have a budget of their own. In every municipality,
treasury offices are set up as an organization of the central governments to control the execution of state expenditures
of local governments. All financial authority has been assigned to them in order to control the use of the state grants.
Without owning resource revenues of their own, it is difficult to foresee how local governments can adequately
function. Five percent of revenues come from locally generated fines and taxes.” The authors feel that the reason
roads are so badly maintained is the prevailing competition for funds between local and central authorities and that
more revenues should be assigned to local governments “without strings.” Building of roads and maintaining them
should primarily be a function of local governments, they argue (ibid., pp. 116–117).
15 Elvira and Besnik Aliaj (1998, p. 98) note, for instance, “The new growth areas lack basic infrastructure,
such as roads, water, sewerage, and social facilities. Within the existing urban zone, the public authorities are
working with inadequate infrastructure networks and social facilities that have forgone capital investments in recent
decades and [are] severely strained by the new growth pressures.”42
PROPOSED STRATEGIES FOR CITY DEVELOPMENT IN ALBANIA
The Driscoll, Ersenkal, and Iadarola study (1994, pp. 23–32) recommends for Tirana that an
orderly expansion of residential land should be encouraged by a coordinated expansion of major
infrastructure networks including roads, public transport, water supply, sewage facilities, and
drainage. It suggests that in the context of developing options for residential land management,
policies and strategies should focus on:
¤  providing access to land for residential and economic development of all income groups;
¤  developing mechanisms to legally integrate new growth into the municipality and the district;
¤  strengthening institutional capacities at both central and local levels to implement land
development projects;
¤  identifying legal structures and development controls which create more efficient land
markets through responsive policies; and
¤   mobilizing private resources through the use of public/private partnerships to  provide land
and housing.
The formulation of land management policies in Albania also provides an opportunity to
develop strategies that avoid the problems associated with rapid urban growth that have occurred
in other countries undergoing similar transitions:
¤  providing infrastructure servicing before settlements reach a density level that either results
in high servicing costs or precludes servicing because of a lack of financing;
¤  developing proactive land management strategies that make realistic assessment of the
amount of land required for urbanization to minimize the loss of agricultural land;
¤  developing cost-recovery precedents early in the urban development process, thereby
establishing a tradition and a willingness to pay for land and services; and
¤  encouraging spatial development patterns that avoid economic stratification and lead to
inequitable development and inefficient servicing patterns. This includes developing
strategies to balance long-term urban and suburban growth patterns (Driscoll, Ersenkal, and
Iadarola 1994, pp. 23–24).
A second priority, according to Driscoll, Ersenkal, and Iadarola (1994, pp. 26–27), is to
regularize informal development. The study notes that major cities in CEE facing similar growth
patterns may have upward of 65 percent of their new residential development outside of the
formal system, and that the figure in Tirana is probably over half (ibid., p. 7).
11. MOBILITY OF LABOR
A major feature of many CEE cities is the presence of unemployment; worker redundancy was
largely hidden in the days of state socialism. Also, as agriculture modernizes and is reshaped by
agrarian reforms, more people are released from farming and are searching urban areas for work.
Now unemployment figures range from 12 to 25 percent in the CEE cities (UNECE 1998b,
p. 26). Nonetheless, as more economic activity is concentrated in the central city of the country, a43
new distribution of jobs is developing. Although privatization initially eliminated jobs, new
enterprises are being established, resulting in some increase in available jobs.
The emergence of new industries in Warsaw is a good example. Migration to cities to take
new jobs may be frustrated by the fact that apartments are scarce. Those most frustrated by this
lack of housing are the lowest-skilled and lowest-paid workers, those least likely to have access
to financing. It appears that even when the countrywide unemployment is high, some cities may
have low jobless rates. One estimate shows that the reduction in the official housing queue of
three persons would increase labor supply by one full-time employee in Poland. If the housing
queue were eliminated entirely, full-time work availability would increase by 6.9 percent (Dale-
Johnson and Gabriel 1995, pp. 399–400).
Others do not subscribe to the view that lack of housing hampers economic development in
Poland. UNECE believes that immobility of labor may be caused by a housing shortage but that
Poland’s economic development appears not to be much affected. The UNECE notes that Poland
became the first central European country to register an increase in economic activity after the
reforms of 1989, with a GDP increasing by 2.6 percent in 1992, 5.2 percent in 1994, 7 percent in
1995, and 6 percent in 1996. Concomitantly, inflation was markedly reduced. Still this economic
activity took place without much change in an unemployment rate of about 15 percent. In a
somewhat confusing and paradoxical statement, the UNECE noted that “A deep quantitative
deficit of dwellings is hindering the migration of workers between regions. High unemployment
among young people means that they do not earn sufficiently to save money for housing.
Unemployment has drastically reduced the demand for housing and will continue to do so”
(UNECE 1998a, pp. 2–3).
The new pattern of industrialization in the Czech and Slovak Republics is strongly
differentiated geographically and is generating considerable employment in the larger urban
centers of Prague and Bratislava and a few other industrial centers. Meanwhile, regions with old
and inefficient large-scale, often heavy industries are suffering contraction and losses of jobs. In
Prague, unemployment is incredibly low, 0.3 percent, while in some other outlying areas it is as
much as 6 to 8 percent. Prague is suffering a labor shortage of serious dimensions. In these
conditions, the lack of sufficient new housing or the flexible use of the older stock has been a
constraint on labor mobility.
When housing is in short supply, prices rise, employers have to hike the wages they pay to
attract workers. This expense will be passed on to consumers, making Czech and Slovak goods
less competitive on the world market. Or, because of labor scarcity employers may decide not to
expand their operations. Scarcity of housing can deter the expansion of economic activity in
areas where the market would justify it. Thus faster privatization, establishment of a mortgage
market, deregulation of rental markets, and development of an expeditious foreclosure procedure
are all greatly needed (Kingsley and Mikelsons 1996, pp. 188, 211–21).
Major institutional innovations are necessary in the CEE region before a fluid and
responsive housing market can be created. Cooperatives, which make up about 20 percent of
housing stock, have managed to insulate themselves from much change. Municipally owned
social stock (about 23 percent of housing stock) is in flux and is only slowly moving toward
privatization. The new housing market is, for all intents and purposes, completely stagnant; while
government building has stopped, the private sector has not moved to replace it.44
Also important to the encouragement of mobility of labor is the existence of various forms
of land tenure in urban housing. Rental properties are very much in demand by newcomers to the
cities and young couples who are needed to make up the workforce there. In Hungary, rental
properties were moved in great haste from the public to the private sector, leaving the remaining
rental sector attenuated. Indeed, Daniel (1997, p. 162) claims that there is not another city in the
world with so low a population in rental housing as Budapest. Scarcity of rental units has bid up
the price of rentals and remains as an important barrier to labor mobility (Daniel 1993, p. 108).
Having a large number of rental units facilitates labor mobility because people can easily move
from one location to another to follow a job. It is more difficult to move from an owned home to
another owned home (Daniel 1997, p. 162).
12. PROPERTY RECORDS
The existence of a functional, current, and publicly accessible cadastre showing all titles and
boundaries is an essential foundation for the new reforms. Developing a titling system in which
people have faith should help to give them security. Property ownership records need to be
accurate and transparent. Bulgaria, for example, has not provided public access to records even
though USAID is providing $10 million toward the cost of upgrading the 1939 cadastre. Bulgaria
is, however, in a more fortunate position than other CEE countries. Since there was so much
private ownership during the period of state socialism, urban land records have been reasonably
well maintained. Land transactions are recorded at the city’s Notary Office with the transaction
showing the buyer’s and seller’s names, location, size, and market price. Transactions are filed
by the name of the buyer, not by location. The Cadastral Office is separate and, to learn of
changes, its staff inspects notary records from time to time. Because delays in recording and
cadastral inaccuracies are problems for banks, several are considering providing more financing
to update the system (Strong, Reiner, and Szyrmer 1996, pp. 72–73).
In a number of CEE countries, cadastres and land records are being recreated or updated to
international standards of accuracy. The state operates in conjunction with local governments to
maintain these systems and specifies how recording of property transfers should take place.
Property-value maps are being prepared for all large cities in the Czech Republic. Soon it will be
possible to have ready access to this data. Poland has begun to record the actual sales price rather
than an agreed-upon artificial price. The real price is necessary if a proper mortgage system is to
be developed. In the past, it has been necessary to rely on imputed income or assessed property
sales for tax purposes. Now, with open market transactions, a public record has become possible
(Strong, Reiner, and Szyrmer 1996, pp. 251–52).
Throughout the CEE an open and active sales market is stifled if there is a lack of clear title
to urban residential property. In Albania, with current confusion about the establishment of
condominiums, the problem is compounded. Presently, newly privatized owners register their
contracts with the Hipoteca office.
16 They are then considered owners and have the right to sell
                                               
16 Stanfield, Childress, and Dervishi (1998, p. 11) describe the inadequacies of the hipoteka by noting that most of
them were closed for the last 15 years of state socialism. These offices were repositories for transaction contracts and
had functioned in most cities until 1976. At that time the government largely eliminated market transactions.
Beginning in 1991, the office opened again to accommodate the privatization of the economy. Still, however, “In the
Tirana Hipoteka Office, working conditions were extremely cramped, the office is very busy, and records are not45
their property. But just what property would be conveyed by any sale is ambiguous. Although
the privatization fee includes an explicit payment for a pro-rated share of the land under the
apartment house, the contract does not mention either the land or the common areas of the
building. It only describes the apartment proper (Lowry 1993, p. 14). This ambiguous situation
regarding common property exists in spite of the approval of the 1994 law for the immovable
registration system for all real property in Albania and the new Civil Code, which contains
provisions for ownership, lease, and transfer of rights to immovable property.
13. CONCLUSION
The reforms of the urban property market have not yet improved the housing supply problems
that existed under state socialism. Many economies of CEE have been lethargic and, until steady
growth begins in earnest, it is doubtful whether a healthy urban housing sector can emerge. In
most of CEE, the subsidies and financing for housing available under state socialism have been
drastically reduced, but the private sector has not yet decisively stepped in with housing credit.
By selling the units to local governments the state has been spared the costs of upkeep.
Mainly because state dwelling units were suffering from lack of maintenance and would have
required considerable costly repair and rehabilitation, the state transferred these rights to local
governments. Local governments, in turn, have attempted to sell these housing units to their
sitting tenants.
Those households that were relatively wealthier at the beginning of the privatization process
have been able to substantially benefit from the housing reforms. They have been able to
capitalize on the new system by buying the rental properties they were occupying at very low
prices and on exceedingly favorable terms. Sometimes they have improved their flats and traded
up. By not requiring this richer group of buyers to pay more, government may have foregone
important sources of revenue for future housing and infrastructure and unnecessarily attenuated
the rental sector.
Meanwhile, in most countries except those undergoing economic recovery, the number of
new units being constructed annually is lower now than at the end of the 1980s, guaranteeing
that the housing shortage that was the legacy of state socialism has not lessened. In this situation
it is also doubtful that much improvement will occur until an adequate package of finance
measures becomes viable or the private sector is invigorated. The latter depends on economic
upturns in CEE countries.
Low-income households find themselves less favored by the government policy of selling
rental units to sitting tenants. Some are afraid to purchase—even at excellent prices, terms, and
rates—for they are afraid the costs of operation, maintenance, and rehabilitation will be too high
to meet. Low-income households that purchase their rental property are wary that the
government may arbitrarily raise required installment payments or interest rates.
Counterbalancing these factors and providing impetus for renters to buy is their fear that rental
                                                                                                                                                  
easily accessible.… Title searches are not easy to do, and lawyers or notaries typically do not do them.” This system
is clearly inadequate for protecting the rights of the thousands of new property owners that have come into existence
in the past few years.46
rates will rise. Furthermore, many lower-income families are compelled to move out of the
central city because land and housing prices are rising most steeply there.
The problem of income and resource distribution is becoming more serious in the CEE
countries as high-income households are able to take advantage of the new situation while most
poor families are at a disadvantage. However, some low-income families get a subsidy as renters.
In addition, a substantial number of households that are not among the wealthy are taking
advantage of their option to buy at low prices and good terms, giving them a stake in the system
for the first time in their lives. In the final analysis, however, the inequalities of income and
resource distribution under state socialism are rendered more serious under the new system of
free markets.
  Had governments sold rental units at higher prices they would have been able to put more
public funds into housing or greatly needed infrastructure. Roads, systems of public transport,
drinking water, and sewage systems are all being utilized more than under state socialism and are
badly in need of repair or extension. Presently, wealthier families have taken their windfall
profits and run with them. Of course, richer families may also invest these profits in the housing
market, but without government incentives their investments are unlikely to benefit the poor.
Only a few CEE countries have in place housing allowances targeted for low-income residents;
others are planning them.
Another housing reform issue is increased rental rates, though they have met with stiff
resistance in many CEE countries. The rental rates under state socialism were not high enough to
cover operation and management, let alone rehabilitation. Early research seems to show that
rents could rise appreciably, and most families would be able to pay them without a decline in
living standards while housing allowances could be made available for those with low or fixed
incomes. Higher rents would probably cause more renters to purchase their units as protection
against these rates, and rent decontrol would also help outside buyers to decide to purchase
dwelling units for purposes of generating rental income.
Increasing the owner-occupant sector in urban housing in the CEE region, however, will not
guarantee that this sector is rehabilitated through more investment. Upper-income households
may be able to afford some investment of this type, but, until it is possible to borrow, it is
unlikely that private ownership will have this across-the-board effect.
It appears that prices for housing rise immediately upon privatization as the rich with pent-
up demand and with foreign-currency savings compete for the best private stock that is available,
hoping for a cheap but valuable asset that is also a protection from inflation. However, one
reality of the macroeconomic situation in most of the CEE region is that real income for most
households has not increased, so that effective demand for housing cannot be found outside this
high-income group. Falling real prices for housing are not, of course, observed in the central city,
in other parts of the city where business competes with housing, and in the luxury suburbs.
Recent economic reforms are changing where jobs are located in CEE. Large cities are
increasingly the focus of economic activity, and some medium-sized cities that had large heavy
industries under state socialism are closing down. Furthermore, agricultural reforms are causing
some jobs to dry up in farming. This has resulted in increasing migration to large cities, where
needed new workers increasingly cannot find adequate housing financing for their families.
Housing shortages in large cities of CEE may well be thwarting the economic development47
process there, even though unemployment, accentuated by industry privatization, is also a major
problem.
Most of the observations in this paper are made considering references available for the first
five to seven years of the decade, when many reforms were implemented. The following
questions, exploring how these reforms work out in practice, need to be answered by the new
wave of research that must cover the entire decade of the 1990s.
1.  How many of the strong and weak points of state socialism remain in today’s institutions in
the CEE countries to facilitate or hamper development?
2.  Has the free market been able to ameliorate the problem of “hidden homelessness” (the
doubling up of families in one residence)?
3.  Researchers writing on urban housing in CEE have neglected the issue of titling and
registration or have treated it in a very general, superficial manner. For example, with regard
to the Czech and Slovak Republics, Kingsley and Mikelsons (1996, pp. 202–03) state,
“With regard to processing sales transactions…the creation of a truly efficient processing
system is a big job that is still underway. It will no doubt ultimately require the
implementation everywhere of computer-based record systems on the ownership of all
properties: a number of local offices have already made considerable progress in automating
these records. This transition appears to be a success story so far… .” To what extent is
titling and registration a constraint on the development of a free market in urban property?
4.  To what extent do regulations on buying and selling property and the existence of
nationalized property still hamper the working of the free market?
5.  CEE research on the issue of urban housing has not treated to any extent the matter of
zoning and easements. How are they utilized in any parts of the CEE and how do they
facilitate or hamper development?
6.  To what extent are various market system bottlenecks, like the unavailability of housing
materials or their high price, deterring the advancement of the urban housing market in the
CEE?
7.  Are there instances where the government has gone “too far” with reform and weakened the
rental sector such that young families and newcomers to the city cannot find
accommodations? What becomes of low-income families or old people displaced from the
central city?
8.  What have the new condominium laws in countries like Hungary done to facilitate the
housing market? What constitutes a good condominium law and what happens when one
does not exist? Are there alternatives to a condominium law if parliaments are politically
unable to pass one?
9.  Usually the CEE countries do not wait for a certain percentage of apartment holders in a
building to declare that they will buy before beginning to privatize, so it is not unusual to
have a building that is partly owned by the municipality and partly by individuals. What
governance problems are caused by this arrangement and how are they being solved?
10.  The state monopolies on building management have been broken in favor of either private
management firms or associations of tenants. How are these new entities working out in
practice? Which new alternative is better?48
11.  Most urban housing CEE researchers come to the conclusion that the transition to the free
market is exacerbating the inequities of state socialism in various ways. Are there still other
urban housing inequities inherent in the transition? Can the ones mentioned here be
documented? Are there counter phenomena that ameliorate this situation?
12.  Are municipalities who received the transfer of state rental properties able to manage them
better than the central state government? What difficulties have they had in this regard?
Have they sold off property on such favorable terms for buyers that they are not able to
invest or facilitate private investment in the urban housing sector?
13.  One of the primary urban housing-market reforms was to be the gradual increasing of rents
so that they at least cover the operation and management of the units. In many countries this
move met with a great deal of initial political opposition, because it meant raising rents at
the same time that other prices were increasing and earning power was diminished in several
ways. Has this problem been solved, and how? Is it still true that the vast majority of renters
can take substantial hikes in rent without affecting their living standards?
14.  What is the extent of housing privatization in 1999 in the various countries?
15.  To protect the poor and those on fixed incomes against rising prices, many governments
have proposed a housing allowance. To what extent have countries in CEE now enacted
them and how are they working out in practice? Targeting was a major problem under state
socialism. Does it work better under the transitional system?
16.  Have new owners of flats begun to improve them? Did they invest in improvements during
the rental period (during which time they seem to have had very secure tenure rights)? Why
or why not? Is it true that wealthier new owners improve their units with their own savings,
but that poorer new owners are impeded by the lack of financing for rehabilitation purposes?
What are the bottlenecks to housing stock repair and rehabilitation?
17.  When privatization was announced real prices for homes rose substantially but, as those
with effective demand purchased the best available units, real prices dropped (this refers to
the average price, even though in some suburbs and in the center of town prices continued to
rise). Did these trends continue through the last part of the decade? In which countries did
these trends not prevail and why?
18.  In those CEE countries that have had a modest upturn in macroeconomic indicators in the
late 1990s, what has been the concomitant change in the urban housing market? Poland, for
example, is growing at respectable rates. What has happened to the urban housing market
there? What is happening to the urban housing market in CEE countries that are still in dire
economic straits?
19.  In what ways is the lack of affordable housing in major CEE cities thwarting the
development process by interfering with the mobility of labor? Is this problem still serious
in countries that have a great deal of urban unemployment?
20.  Is there evidence that development of squatter settlements on the periphery of cities is
occurring? Why is it occurring? Should this settlement be discouraged, or is it really a
response to the need for labor in cities, thus helping to facilitate the mobility of labor? How
can this settlement be regularized?
21.  To what extent is rent control still influencing the vitality of the housing market?49
22.  Has the process of restitution displaced many renters, and if so, what has become of them?
23.   Most financial institutions were rudimentary in CEE in the early- to mid-1990s. Which ones
have become viable and have assisted households in obtaining their private dwellings?
24.  Why has Tirana, with its poverty, lack of financing, and real estate professionals, developed
such a boom in urban construction?
25.  Is the restitution process in many CEE cities still stymied and why?
26.  How can financing for urban infrastructure be facilitated?50
ANNEX:STUDYING THE URBAN HOUSING MARKET
Most of the studies cited in this paper have been accomplished by using a combination of
authoritative informants, examining the census and the public record, and the files of the nascent
network of real estate agents. There have also been several household surveys such as the one
done in 1992 by Hegedüs and Kovacs for the United Nations in Hungary, which was published
informally and is no longer available (Hegedüs, Mark, and Tosics 1996, p. 79). In Hungary,
every two years the Central Statistical Office conducts a Household Budget Survey (HBS) based
on a national sample. These surveys canvas around 12,000 randomly selected households and are
based on a uniform sample frame developed from the population census.
The HBS gives considerable detail on income and expenditure and uses a relatively long
observation period of two months. Although the HBS has all of the usual problems of gathering
information with questionnaires, these surveys offer a detailed source of data on housing and
other reforms. The sampling unit is the dwelling, which may contain more then one household.
The Hungarian Central Statistical Office (CSO) provides survey weights and the census data
underlies all surveys. Participation in the HBS is voluntary so there is a potential problem of
nonresponse. The CSO’s definition of nonresponse covers both cases of failure to contact the
sampled household and cases in which the household refuses to participate or drops out after the
interviews have begun.
Overall, the response rate has been good in comparison to Western surveys. In 1991, 73
percent of selected households were successfully contacted to supply data. Response is not
uniform; a higher percentage of rural than urban interviews are successful. High-income, young
families, and “families living in disordered conditions” respond less frequently. Whenever there
is a nonresponse, a new dwelling is selected at random from the same area (Pudney 1994,
pp. 252–56; Pudney 1995, p. 76).
Douglas (1997, pp. 96–108) describes his survey in Budapest in some detail. Besides
questions regarding socioeconomic aspects of the household, Douglas examined such issues as
labor market activity, attitudes toward the transformation process, renovation of housing, and
neighborhood satisfaction. He selected eight neighborhoods in which the survey was to be
implemented. He sought to have each neighborhood represent one of the following
characteristics: (1) upper-status new area, (2) older upper-status area, (3) lower-status inner-city
ghetto, (4) lower-status, inner-city working class, (5) housing estates from the 1950s, (6)
buildings from the 1960s and 1970s, (7) buildings from the 1980s, and (8) a self-built,
predominately lower-class suburb.
With these characteristics in mind, Douglas (1997) performed a cluster analysis, a statistical
procedure which identifies homogeneous groups of cases based on their values for a set of
variables, using the 1990 Hungarian population census. The goal was to analyze the 418 Urban
Planning Units (UPU) in Budapest that contained more than 250 dwellings and pick 8
neighborhoods that would illustrate the types mentioned above. The study isolated 16 useful
variables on which to select the UPUs. The variables were households per dwelling, number of
dwellings per UPU, dwelling density per hectare, percent of active workers, percent of dwellings
with a toilet, percent of the population 0–13 years, percent of the population over 60 years,
percent of one-story buildings, percent of dwelling built before 1960, population density per51
hectare, population per UPU, percent of population with a primary education, percent private
dwellings, percent of dwellings with one room, percent of dwellings with three rooms or more,
and percent of population with a university education.52
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